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PREFACE 
This dissertation seeks to determine what effect outside grants-in-
aid have on expenditure levels of major local government services. Since 
there is no control group of representative governments or some other 
prior standard with which to compare the empirical results, it was nec-
essary to develop an "a priori" abstract theoretical model and then 
compare the actual response, generated statistically, with the response 
which was developed from abstract deductive inference. The theoretical 
model used assumptions common to microeconomic theory. 
Five major functional expenditure areas were examined: Education, 
Highways, Public Welfare, Health, and Public Housing and Urban Renewal. 
In two functions, Highways, and Public Housing and Urban Renewal, the 
theoretical and empirical response were identical. In the remaining 
three functions, the severe fiscal problems associated with meeting 
expanding needs with limited local tax resources seemed to be the deciding 
factor which determined the actual response. 
I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation for 
the assistance and guidance given me by the following members of my com-
mittee: Dr. Ansel Sharp, Dr. Robert Sandmeyer, Dr. Gerald Lage and Dr. 
John Franzmann. These men not only made many helpful comments in written 
form, but also met with me personally on a number of occasions to discuss 
many of the problems which I encountered during the research. In addition 
I would like to thank Mrs. Maria Nease for her typing excellence and my 
wife Marcia who helped in proofing all the revisions, and who gave her 
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moral support which was greatly needed during some of the periods when 
the work was proceeding rather slowly. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Considerable research has been done in the field of public finance 
concerning the determinants of combined state-local government expendi-
tures.1 Investigations have also been undertaken to explain the variation 
in local government expenditures. 2 This study will concentrate on a 
topic closely related to expenditure determinants and variations in 
expenditures; namely the expenditure response of local governments to 
external grants-in-aid. 
Expenditure response of local governments to external grants-in-aid 
may be explained in terms of stimulation and substitution effects. It is 
generally accepted that external aid has a stimulating effect when per 
capita local spending from local resources increases on a particular ser-
vice as a result of an increase in per capita outside aid to that function, 
and it has a substituting effect when per capita local spending from 
local resources declines on a particular service as a result of an 
increase in per capita outside aid to that function. 3 These generally 
accepted definitions of stimulation and substitution effects were used 
in this study although research concerned with expenditure response of 
the receiving government to outside grants has concentrated on the effect 
of federal aid on combined state-local government spending. This investi-
gation focused on the response of local government spending, and more 
attention was devoted to state aid rather than federal aid as the external 
1 
source of funds. It should be noted, however, that where federal aid to 
states was redistributed by states to local governments, this aid was 
considered a component part of state aid. 
That external grants play a significant role in the financing of 
various local functional activities was revealed by the data presented 
2 
in Table I, which shows aid amounts extended to five functions that are 
specifically examined in this thesis. Local expenditures totaled nearly 
$60 billion in 1967, 4 and over one-third of this amount, $20.7 billion, 
came from intergovernmental transfers ($19 billion state and $1.7 billion 
direct federal grants). The distribution of these outside aid revenues 
revealed that three functions received most of the intergovernmental 
funds. Over $16.4 billion of the $20.7 billion, or about 80% of total 
aid resources, went to Education, Highways, and Public Welfare activities. 
In the case of Health as well as Public Housing and Urban Renewal functions, 
much smaller local outlays were involved in absolute terms; however, 
the proportion of these functional expenditures financed with external 
funds was quite substantial. 
Purpose of Thesis 
Werner Hirsch, in a recent article, examined the various research 
efforts which attempted to explain the factors affecting expenditures of 
state and local governments. In connection with his examination he noted 
the following: "State and federal aid poses some interesting questions 
which these studies have not yet illuminated, i.e., whether federal and 
state subsidies are substituted for or supplements to local sources. 115 
An attempt to answer the question raised by Hirsch was the focus of this 
study. In other words, what is the expenditure response of local 
governments to external subsidies? 
1967 EXPENDITURES AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL REVENUES (in millions) 
Percent of Direct Percent of 
State Inter- State Inter- Federal Inter- Federal Inter- Percent 
Total Local governmental governmental governmental governmental of All Aid to 
Expenditures Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue ~enditure 
Education $27,000* $11,000* 40.7% $ 580 2.1% 42.8% 
Highways $ 4,533 $ 1,861 41.1% $ 33 .7% 41.8% 
Public Welfare $ 3,958 $ 2,897 67.3% $ 19 .5% 67.8% 
Health $ 580 $ 185 31.9% $ 16* 2.8% 34.7% 
Public Housing 
and Urban Renewal$ 1,441 $ 67 4 .. 6% $ 667 46.3% 50.9% 
Other Local 
General Expenses $22,010 $ 2,990 13.5% $ 424 1.9% 15.4% 
Total $59,522 $19,000 31.9% $1,739 2.9% 34.8% 
*Estimates are minor deviations from actual amounts in order to correct for inadequate data or expenditures 
associated with non-aided activities. 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Census, "State Payments to Local Governments," Washington, 1967; and U.S. Bureau of 
Census, "Governmental Finances, 1966-67," Washington, 1968. 
w 
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The expenditure response is of considerable importance to grantor 
agencies. Outside aid is extended in order to achieve economic and poli-
tical objectives of external governments. Therefore, if the aid fails to 
elicit the desired response, the grantor would like to know the direction 
and possible magnitude of any expenditure deviation. For example, the 
subsidizing government may be anticipating a stimulation response, while 
the actual response becomes one of substitution. 
In this writer's approach to the expenditure response question, the 
hypothetical responses were developed on an abstract theoretical basis 
as they emanated from the three broad classifications of aid: general 
non-matching, specific non-matching, and specific matching grants. Then, 
the empirical responses generated from a statistical analysis were 
estimated on leading functional activities. 
Organization 
Chapter II was an examination of the abstract theory of the 
expenditure response and a development of the hypothetical response 
associated with the main types of aid--these main aid types being 
general non-matching, specific non-matching, and specific matching 
grants. Chapter III contained the empirical tests of the expenditure 
response on major functional activities of local governments. These 
tests were performed in a statistical framework. In Chapter IV the 
primary theoretical and empirical implications of the research were 
summarized. 
5 
FOOTNOTES 
1The following works are of primary importance: Roy W. Bahl and 
Robert J. Saunders, "Determinants of Changes in State and Local Govern-
ment Expenditures," National Tax Jotitrtal, Vol. XVIII (March, 1965) , pp. 
50-57; Solomon Fabricant, The Trend.of.Government Activity in the United 
States Since 1900, (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952), Chapter 
6; Glenn W. Fisher, "Determinants of State and Local Government Expendi-
ture: A Preliminary Analysis," National Tax Journal, Vol. XVII (March, 
1964), pp. 55-74; Ernest Kurnow, "Determinants of State and Local Expen-
diture Re-examined," National Tax Journal, Vol. XVI (September, 1963), 
pp. 252-255; Elliott R. Morss, "Some Thoughts on the Determinants of 
State and Local Expenditure," National Tax Journal, Vol. XIX (March, 
1966), pp. 95-104; Seymour Sacks and Robert Harris, "The. Determinants 
of State and Local Government Expenditures and Intergovernmental Flows 
of Funds," National Tax Journal, Vol. XVII (March, 1964), pp. 75-85. 
2The following works are of primary importance: Robert F. Adams, 
"The Fiscal Response to Intergovernmental Transfers in Less Developed 
Areas of the United States," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 
XLVIII (August, 1966), pp. 308-313; Harvey Brazer, City Expenditure in 
the United States, (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1959); Jerry 
Miner, Social and Economic Factors in Spending for Public Education, 
(Syracuse, 1963). 
3 See: Jack W. Osman, "The Dual Impact of Federal Aid on State and 
Local Government Expenditures," National Tax Journal, Vol. XIX 
(December, 1966), p. 362; David Smith, "The Response of State and Local 
Governments to Federal Grants," National Tax Journal, Vol. XXI 
(September, 1968), p. 354. 
41967 expenditure data is used since the Bureau of Census only 
produces a complete Census of Governments on five year intervals. The 
new Census will appear in 1973. 
5werner Hirsch, "The Supply of Urban Public Services," In Issues 
In Urban Economics, edited by Harvey S. Perloff and Lowden Wingo, Jr., 
(Washington: Resources for the Future, Inc.), 1968, pp. 500-501. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL EXPENDITURE RESPONSE OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT TO EXTERNAL AID 
Analysis of the theoretical expenditure response of local government 
to external aid requires an understanding that the outside government 
will set the grant standards and that these standards will reflect the 
priorities of the subsidizing government. Grantor preferences may take 
into consideration the fiscal deficiencies of local community financing, 
and/or the spillover benefits of the local spending which accrue to out-
siders. The communities, when making their expenditure decisions, do 
tend to ignore the external benefits inherent in certain public activities. 
They will spend up to the point where marginal local public costs equal 
marginal internal public benefits. The nation or state extending the aid 
may consider the local public output to be less than optimal when local 
governments operate under this self-interest maximizing condition. 
Therefore, the grantor state or central government would specify aid 
conditions which would attempt to induce a greater. expenditure from 
recipient communities. 1 A matching grant is the type of aid usually 
offered to encourage an increased quantity of certain local services. 
Even though the subsidizing government stipulates the grant 
conditions, the receiving government has the option of accepting or 
rejecting the aid. If it accepts the subsidy, it does so with the 
intention of improving its welfare position. Yet, in order to introduce 
6 
7 
the preference patterns of local governments into a theoretical framework 
of expenditure response, one must take into consideration how the local 
expenditure decision is determined. 
This decision involves a political process, and it is assumed that 
local officeholders will try to carry out the spending programs that will 
2 
assure them the largest number of votes. Even though the individuals in 
a community would have differing demands for public goods and for particu-
lar aided goods, they do make these demands known to public officials 
through the regular voting process and through personal contact with local 
authorities. Mayors, councilmen, school board members--whoever the 
decision makers might be--are continually trying to determine and inter-
pret the will of the dominant voting blocs in their jurisdiction. By this 
process, the officials in the community develop their perception of a 
community welfare function which they feel fairly represents the welfare 
of the community. To the extent that the authorities make acceptable 
decisions consistent with dominant voter preferences, they continue to 
remain in office. If the citizens disagree with the local officials, 
these officials may be voted out of office at the next election. 3 
The indifference curves used in this study do not represent the true 
preference map of all the citizens. This map is not the actual social 
welfare function of the community, because there is no acceptable method 
of aggregating voter preferences without resorting to interpersonal 
utility comparisons. Instead, the writer substituted the preferences of 
the governing body as a proxy for community preferences. It is the 
governing authorities' welfare function that is being maximized as they 
adjust to various aid arrangements. Utilization of this technique does 
not entirely avoid the preference aggregation problem, as the governing 
body often has more than one decision making participant. 4 This funda-
mental difficulty cannot be eliminated. Nevertheless, it is beneficial 
8 
to use indifference curves, and a conceptual welfare function in examining 
the response to subsidies which act to augment local budgets or to cheapen 
the price of public goods purchased by local governments. 
Even though the analysis adheres to the fundamental assumption of 
local officials' acting in the best interests.of their constituents, 
exceptions to this could occur in the "real world." Local officials 
guided by community self-interest in making grant decisions might be 
thwarted by special interest groups demanding another solution. Also, it 
is possible that the authorized local decision makers might take a 
"broad" view concerning programs subsidized by aid which could encompass 
the spillover benefit objectives of the granter agency. In this situation, 
aided activities could be expanded beyond the level predicted by a model 
that ignored external interests. And finally, there is the possibility 
that the necessary information about community needs is lacking, and 
this could lead to inaccurate welfare adjustments. 5 The final result 
could be a non-optimal resource allocation. It should be noted, however, 
that one of the general assumptions in this study is the presumption of 
perfect knowledge on the part of local authorities that would disallow 
the "bad" decision to occur in the theoretical model. 
Classification of Aid 
Aid may be classified in several ways: by its functional 
distribution (education, highways, welfare, for example), 6 by administra-
tive procedures in its distribution--e.g., formula grants which are 
approved by administrative decisions, or by a process which classifies 
9 
7 grants by conditions associated with their use. The theory presented 
in this chapter uses the latter classification. 
In grouping grants by conditions surrounding their use, virtually 
all aid could be included in the following categories: 
1. General Non-Matching Grants. This is a grant that is given to 
local governments with no strings attached. It is an external addition 
to local income which the recipient can spend as it chooses. Many forms 
of shared taxes would also fall in this grouping. 
2. Specific Non-Matching Grants. This is a conditional type grant 
8 (sometimes called "bloc grants") which differs from general non-matching 
aid on the basis that the granter government specifies how the aid must 
be spent. Generally, the restrictions take the form of a s-tipulation that 
the funds must be directed toward a particular activity. Some shared 
taxes might be included here if the upper level government required the 
returned tax receipts to be allocated to a specific activity. 
3. Specific Matching Grants. Aid of this type is not only 
restricted to a specific program, but the granter requires the local 
government to put up a portion of the total amount expended on the project 
from its own internal tax sources. 
A further sub-classification of the three broad grant categories can 
be made by dividing the subsidies into "open-end" and "closed-end" aid. 
The "open-end" aid is a grant given without any expenditure limits. 
Public Welfare is an example of "open-end" aid. Functional spending here 
depends on the number of recipients needing help, and the level of 
assistance which is decided upon by the local administering authority. 
Because of these contingencies, Congress has not set a statutory limit 
on this aid. 9 The "closed-end" grant, such as the Federal Special Milk 
10 
10 Program, has a ceiling on the subsidy which is set by Congress for 
each individual state. While conceptually there are theoretical differen-
ces between "open-end" and "closed-end" aid, the "closed-end" grant is by 
far the most connnon. In this study differences will be discussed between 
both types of subsidies as the theoretical model is set forth. 
General Assumptions 
For the purposes of this investigation the following general 
assumptions are: 
1. There is perfect knowledge on the part of all economic agents. 
This assumed that nothing will hamper the decisions of governmental 
authorities in their response to aid. Given all the factors, the 
decision response to aid will result in a movement that will maximize 
the welfare of the citizens, to the extent that authorities recognize 
this welfare. 
2. The indifference curves are normally shaped. In graphical 
analysis, they are depicted as sloping downward toward the right, and 
they are convex to the origin. Not only is substitutability implied, but 
the substitution rate declines as more of the aided good is consumed. 
3. Local taxes necessary to finance local public expenditures are 
included in the connnunity income restraint. As the trade-offs are 
examined from the subsequent graphs, the vertical axis, called Y, will 
include public spending on all other public goods plus all private 
spending. The Y good is actually community income for all other uses. 
Good X, to be shown on the horizontal axis, represents the aided good or 
service. An increase in expenditures on X might involve an increase in 
local tax burdens to finance the expenditure. This implies a decline in 
11 
private spending or a decline in expenditures on other public goods, or 
even a combination of increased taxing and reduced spending on other 
public commodities. Conversely, a reduction in expenditure on X implies 
a pos~ibility of tax relief, and/or increased expenditure on other public 
services. 
4. Local governments are assumed to operate with balanced budgets. 
Consequently, debt financing is excluded from the analysis. This simpli-
fies the theory and is not too unrealistic. In fact, many states often 
prohibit borrowing in excess of anticipated revenues to finance current 
expenditures. 
5. A "tax illusion" is assumed to exist. This means local 
governments do not include the disutility of any increase in taxes paid 
by the local ci~izens to the grantor government which may be necessary in 
11 
order to finance the grants. If the people were taxed in a manner 
proportional to the grant received, disregarding any redistrfbuti,on 
effects, then it could be argued that aid would shift the budget line 
outward while the external tax would shift the restraint line back to 
its original position. No response would be forthcoming from the local 
connnunity. However, if the citizens and the local officials who repre-
sent them take outside taxes as given (i.e., the taxes from external 
governments are predetermined and unidentifiable with the specific grant), 
then the taxpayer and his decision proxy, the local officials, may make 
adjustments concentrating primarily on local benefits and consider tax 
b d h. d 12 ur ens as unc ange. 
6. Tastes and preferences are assumed to be constant. This 
indicates that the indifference curves do not change shape as grants are 
received. It does not mean that all curves are identically shaped or 
equidistant from each other as they are placed on the utility surface. 
12 
7. The aided public goods are assumed to be normal goods. This 
implies that increases in community income, either from external or 
internal sources, would be used to expand all local government activities. 
This assumption should not be taken to mean that discrete and separate 
tax or expenditure decisions cannot occur. It is possible for the conrrnu-
nity to increase taxes and apply the entire tax increase to one functional 
activity. However, when all separate tax and expenditure decisions are 
aggregated, it is anticipated that a variety of government services would 
show increased output. 
General Non-Matching Grants 
The analysis for a non-matching grant which contains no expenditure 
restriction is the least complicated of all grants to describe. If it is 
assumed as in Figure 1, that the local conrrnunity is in initial equilibrium 
at point L prior to aid, it would be consuming ox1 of X and .oY1 , in dol-
lars of all other goods. Now, a grant is received from the overlying 
government of AB dollars, shifting the community income line outward to 
BB'. Since none of the goods available to the receiving government are 
inferior (see Assumption 7), this type of grant, being an income subsidy 
without strings attached, allows the community to spend as it chooses. 
This should result in an increase in the consumption of both X and Y. 
The representative income-consumption line, 00 1 , shows that funds from 
this type of grant are divided between the aided good and all other 
alternatives. The subsidy permits the local conrrnunity to move along its 
actual income-consumption expansion path to a higher indifference curve, 
and in so doing, the aid will effectively maximize the welfare of the 
locality. This form of aid is expected to bring forth the substitution 
13 
expenditure response, since the recipient connnunity can spread these 
external funds to a variety of public services rather than spending them 
all on one particular function. 
Since these grants provide the ultimate in expenditure flexibility 
to local authorities, they are not designed to encourage the localities 
to direct their spending toward programs that have large external spill-
over benefits. Therefore, only small amounts of this aid are extended 
to local governments as compared to grants that put restrictions on the 
aid. In 1967, $1.5 billion was provided for general support, and this 
was merely 2.5% of total state intergovernmental expenditures. 13 
Specific Non-Matching Grants 
Income subsidies are sometimes made available to local governments 
on condition that the funds must be used to purchase quantities of a 
specific public commodity. An excellent example of this type subsidy is 
federal impact aid to local school districts. These funds were given to 
compensate local communities for the presence of large scale tax exempt 
federal activities in the area. 14 Since this aid does not require any 
matching on the part of the recipient government it may be possible to 
substitute these external funds for local resources and redirect current 
spending toward other alternatives, which of course might also include 
the X program. Therefore, the initial equilibrium position of the local 
community prior to aid is of considerable importance in determining the 
extent to which substitution of outside funds for internal resources can 
occur. 
To examine the phenomena, one may assume that the local government 
is consuming ox1 of X and OY1 of other alternatives in the absence of aid 
Community Income 
For Other Uses 
14 
y 
B 
I 
A // 
Yz 
~ 
yl 
0'--~~~~-'-~~---~--',.__~~~~~~~~~~-X 
x1 x2 A' B' Aided Good 
Figure 1. General Non-Matching Grant 
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(see Figure 2). Then, the grantor government offers a specific non-
matching grant, AB (this is "closed-end" aid in the sense that no 
purchases of X with outside funds can be made in excess of A'B') which 
must be spent entirely on X. Since the aid does not change the effective 
price per unit of the public good, for units in excess of AG units, the 
new budget restriction becomes AGB'. This implies that all governments 
presently consuming X in excess of the minimum AG could look on the sub-
sidy as an external addition to income. The local government which 
started at point L would move to position M. In this case the grant is 
generating a simple income effect, so that the receipt of aid, AB, re-
leases an equal amount of internal funds, which is then allocated between 
all alternative public activities including good X. The actual expendi-
ture response would be one of substitution. A response which is identical 
to the one shown for general non-matching aid. 
Two qualifications to the above result should be noted. One relates 
to a situation where the community uses none of its own funds to purchase 
the public good (an initial equilibrium at point A). In this instance, 
since it is necessary to spend at least the grant funds on X, there could 
b 1 k f f d f h 1 1 . . . 15 e no ea age o grant un s to pay or ot er oca activities. If a 
local government were consuming zero quantities of the aided commodity, 
it would consider the subsidy as a "free gift" of the X connnodity. In 
this circumstance the grant would be generating a neutral expenditure 
response. 
The second qualification would be in regard to a subsidy that is 
quite large relative to current expenditures on X. For example, if aid 
in the amount of AC is given, the restraint line becomes ANC'. The 
portion of the AC grant that provides AN units of X commodity could be 
Conununity Income 
For Other Uses 
c 
B 
A 
16 
y 
"" 
O' 
" \ 
' "" 
"" 
'-~~-....:.~~~~~~~~~~.:I.-~~~~~~~~~ x 
0 A' B' C ' Aided Good 
Figure 2. Specific Non-Matching Grant 
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considered an income subsidy in the sense that it releases local funds 
in the amount AY1 to be spent as the community chooses. If Assumption 7' 
that an addition to income is allocated to all available alternatives, 
is accepted, the result would be that spending on X and Y would both 
increase. The income effect of the aid would dictate a position at P 
(assuming initial equilibrium at L); yet, the "free gift" effect of aid 
would not be fully exhausted. If more X can be consumed at a zero 
price, up to the limits of the grant, then the local conununity would 
continue to consume X out to point N. 
The movement from point L to point N implies an expenditure response 
of substitution, the same response as was initially illustrated. 
Actually, this latter case is dependent on the grant's being quite large 
in relation to current local spending on X and, also, on the likelihood 
of the local government's having a low marginal propensity to consume X 
( 00 1 • • l' ) 16 steep 1ncome-consumpt1on 1ne. 
While specific non-matching aid will usually generate expenditure 
responses similar to general support grants, these subsidies can often 
be used to encourage certain desired practices. For example, the 
external government may make the aid contingent on the recipient community 
adopting special budgetary and planning procedures. In other words, the 
aid may act to induce local authorities to become better fiscal managers.17 
Specific Matching Grants 
Grants of this type are designed to encourage increased local 
spending on certain goods and services to obtain the external benefits 
associated with these commodities. Local governments, when making their 
expenditure decisions, tend to ignore the external benefits that may be 
18 
derived from the public program; so matching funds are offered by the 
external government in order to insure a more optimum level of the local 
service. If grants are to be extended in an ideal fashion, then those 
programs which have greater spillover benefits should be funded with a 
larger proportion of grant monies. 
External subsidies of the matching type appear as a price change in 
the eyes of the local decision makers. Even though the price paid to the 
producers of the good does not actually change, the situation is analo-
gous to a price change in the sense that the local community can purchase 
more of the aided commodity with the same outlay from internal sources 
18 than could otherwise be purchased. The matching subsidy acts to lower 
the relative cost of implementing a specific program, and this enhances 
19 the attractiveness of the program to the local government. This 
attractiveness is based on the overall price (cost) effect. The price 
(cost) effect is divided into a substitution effect which makes the price 
of X lower relative to the prices of other alternatives, thereby causing 
20 
more X to be consumed; and a real income effect which causes the 
community to purchase more of all available services, including X, as 
the average price of all programs are lowered when the price of one 
program declines. 
Translation of the above effects into the probable expenditure 
response of local governments necessitates knowledge of the level of 
expenditure on the aided good prior to the grant, the elasticity of 
demand for the subject commodity, and any special restrictions on the 
aid which would tend to force the aid response in a predetermined direc-
tion. It will be shown later in the chapter that the responses can 
differ if the local community is not consuming any of the good, from the 
19 
one that might result if positive quantities of the commodity are being 
consumed prior to the aid. Sometimes the grant might require a minimum 
effort before matching funds become available. A restriction in this 
form might be the most important factor in the determination of whether 
a stimulation or substitution response would be forthcoming. Finally, 
demand elasticities can be quite important. If demand is elastic, this 
would imply that local government expenditure from own sources would be 
increasing (this is the stimulation expenditure response), while an 
inelastic demand would indicate that local outlay from internal sources 
is declining (a substitution expenditure response). Although little 
research has been conducted on demand elasticities, Mark Haskell explained 
the forces that might influence elasticities and David Smith attempted 
to determine, statistically, whether demand for an aided activity was 
. l . 21 price e astic. 
Haskell perceived the following as influencing the elasticity of 
demand: 
1. States which spend a large portion of their budgets on the aided 
good would be presumed to have an elastic demand for the conunodity. The 
idea here comes from "consumer demand theory11 which indicates that demand 
for goods which take a large portion of consumer income is more likely to 
be elastic than for those goods which consume little of a purchaser's 
. 22 income. 
2. For normal goods (these are the ones examined in this thesis) 
the demand for governmental services is an increasing function of per 
capita income, The higher the level of the income of its citizens, the 
more likely that a local government would take a larger quantity of the 
specified good after a given price reduction. Solomon Fabricant, who 
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wrote somewhat earlier on this matter, seems to recognize the existence 
of the high income phenomena--i.e., the marginal valuation of governmental 
services to a community may increase as the income per resident 
. 23 1.ncreases. 
3. Elasticity of demand may vary with philosophical views concerning 
the role of government. A community which is composed of residents with 
"individualistic" notions of local government may prefer to work out 
their own programs. Demand for goods, aided externally, might be more 
inelastic. On the other hand, those localities which have a greater 
number of "welfare state" oriented persons might be willing to take a 
larger quantity of subsidized goods for a given price reduction. 
David Smith conducted a study with the avowed purpose of measuring 
the elasticity of demand for federally aided commodities. This research 
produced elasticity estimates for per capita state-local functional 
expenditures on Education, Highway, Public Welfare, and Health and 
Hospital activities. Using multiple regression techniques, and federal 
aid as a proxy for price reductions, Smith regressed per capita state-
local spending, generated from internal revenue sources, in each of the 
above functions on per capita federal aid to that function, Other rele-
vant variables were also included. The equation was converted to log 
form so as to directly compute the elasticity coefficients. These 
elasticity parameters indicated that demand for Education is completely 
price inelastic, while Highway and Public Welfare demands were highly 
inelastic. The Health and Hospital coefficient was negative which, 
according to Smith, implied inelasticity. Smith took the position that 
matching grants are designed to stimulate local effort from own sources 
on aided goods and, therefore, that elasticity studies should show a 
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stimulation response--i.e., expenditures from internal sources should 
increase. The fact that his coefficients showed the demands to be price 
inelastic indicated that substitution was taking place, and expenditures 
from own sources was declining. 
By failing to include the federal aid in the dependent variable, 
and then regressing total per capita state-local expenditures on federal 
aid, Smith systematically biased his coefficients downward by exactly 
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one. This resulted in the interpretation that functional demands were 
inelastic. Since per capita federal aid is the proxy for the price 
effect, it must be included in the dependent variable to trace its impact 
on spending. If it is included then the coefficients will increase by 
one, and the conclusion would be that demands for the aided services are 
actually price elastic. For some reason there is a dearth of research on 
estimating elasticities on grant aided goods. This is doubly surprising 
when one considers the importance that demand elasticities play in the 
theory of expenditure response to intergovernmental aid. 
In this study, geometric analysis on several types of matching 
grants will be shown as some of the matching forms are more common to one 
functional activity than to another. In an effort to simplify the expo-
sition it will be assumed throughout that the aid response is the one that 
occurs in the initial period. In other words, beginning equilibrium is 
shown in the absence of aid (all expenditures are financed internally), 
and the final equilibrium is depicted with the aid included. This 
technique allows the theoretician to concentrate on the basic aid res-
ponse. But in dealing empirically with the subject, data from later time 
periods are often used because it is more readily available. This would, 
in no wise, negate the theoretical conclusions, but the investigator would 
need to consider this fact when comparing theoretical and empirical results. 
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Simple Matching Case 
The simple matching case, of the "open-end" variety, is shown in 
Figure 3. With initial equilibrium at R, a matching grant is made avail-
able for the X commodity. This aid reduces the apparent price of X and 
rotates the local budget restraint fromAA' to AA". If demand is price 
inelastic, a movement from x1Y1 to x2Y2 would illustrate the local govern-
ment response and put the new equilibrium at point S. A demand that is 
price elastic would put the conrrnunity at a point like S'. At either 
equilibrium position the local government welfare is being maximized. 
An inelastic demand is synonomous with the substitution response and since 
an elastic demand implies the stimulation response, the actual expenditure 
response for the functional activity would depend on the dominant elas-
25 ticity for all local governments. With so many communities suffering 
fiscal deficiencies due to limited tax bases, fear of taxpayer flight, 
and rapidly rising service demands, it may be more likely that local 
governments would seek aids to reduce this fiscal gap or expand service 
levels with outside funds. 26 
On the surface it would seem that most aid recipients would settle 
for some position between V and U, a substitution or neutral response, 
because of the aforementioned problems in local financing. Of course, an 
hypothesis of this type must be tested empirically. Because the outside 
governments will usually permit the grantee to use internal funds cur-
rently being spent on the aided good to meet the local matching portion 
of the grant, the community could continue spending AY1 on X and receive 
RU aid thereby increasing service levels (Y1 R +RU), or the community could 
maintain an O~ service level and allow the external funds to fully sub-
stitute for local effort. 27 Point Sis a compromise position which 
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emphasizes the stimulating qualities of the combined income and substi-
tution effect of the cost reduction associated with the outside subsidy. 
Rather than offer the aid in an "open-ended" fashion, which allows 
the receiving government to devote all its income to X consumption, the 
grantor will often set a limit on the aid--for example, the amount AB as 
shown in Figure 4. This would be a "closed-end" matching grant; and as 
depicted, the amount of outside aid is so restricted that community 
demands which are highly price elastic would receive subsidies only out 
to point U on the AUB' budget line. Of course, those localities with 
highly inelastic demands may not be affected by the limitation put on 
aid. They could move to a position like S, and their expenditure res-
ponse would be identical to which it would have been under the "open-end" 
matching arrangement in Figure 3. 
The "closed-end" grant does present a problem for the empirical re-
searcher who is attempting to relate demand elasticities to substitution-
stimulation responses. The actual data may show that substitution is 
occurring, thereby implying that demands are inelastic when in reality 
the premature cut-off of aid funds prevents a stimulation expenditure 
response. Closing off the aid would result in a "second-best" solution in 
terms of welfare maximization for .those governments preferring greater 
( 
quantities of X under the new subsidized cost ratio than can be obtained 
with the limited amount of external funds. In the graph, a corner solu-
tion is shown for communities having elastic demands for X (preferences 
at S'). They would move to point U where the indifference curve would 
intersect the corner of the budget constraint. 
Matching aid is sometimes made available for separate and specific 
projects, and this aid is referred to as Project Aid. For example, 
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Urban Renewal and Public Housing grants are generally offered subject to 
grantor approval of local government proposed programs. Congress annually 
appropriates the funds for Urban Renewal and Public Housing functional 
aid, then the Department of Housing and Urban Development administers the 
grants on a matching basis for the approved projects throughout the 
nation. 28 Many communities do not fund these activities at all, while 
others only provide in their budgets a very low level of expenditure. 
In fact, to properly depict the expenditure response to this form of 
aid it is better to show the local community in pre-grant equilibrium at 
a position of zero consumption. A typical graphical presentation is shown 
in Figure 5. 
In the absence of aid, the local community would be in equilibrium 
at point A, consuming zero quantities of aided connnodity X. The cost 
ratio between X and other alternative programs is shown by the slope of 
the line AA'. Starting at point A does indicate a lack of interest on 
the part of the local community to support X entirely from own resources. 
However when aid is made available, special interest groups may be strong 
enough to get the local government to reconsider its position and submit 
a request for project funding. If the overall project size is equal to 
ox2 , and the grant is 50-50 matching (slope of AB' would be one-half the 
slope of AA') then the recipient community would put up AY1 funds from 
internal sources to purchase ox1 and would receive external aid which 
would be used to buy x1x2 of X. The result is a strong stimulation expen-
diture response due to the fact that the community was at a zero 
consumption level of X prior to the aid. 
The simple matching grant will lead local governments to consume a 
larger quantity of the aided good than would be the case if they were to 
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receive aid of an equal dollar amount in the form of a general non-
matching or specific non-matching grant. In order to illustrate this 
point consider Figure 6. Suppose the initial point of equilibrium is 
depicted by point Q. As the result of a 50-50 matching grant, the budget 
line rotates to AA". Assume that the local government moves to a new 
equilibrium at point S. The increase in consumption of the aided good, 
from ox1 to ox3 is the result of the combined income and substitution 
effect. The income effect can be isolated by assuming a non-matching 
grant of equal size, distance AB in Figure 6, had been made in lieu of 
the matching grant. After the grant the local government would now be 
in equilibrium at some point like T. This means that the local government 
increases consumption of the aided good from ox1 to ox2 , and this is due 
entirely to the income effect. The remainder of the expansion in 
consumption of the aided good, ox2 to ox3 , has to be the result of the 
substitution effect which is present in the case of matching but absent 
in the case of non-matching grants. 
Foundation Aid 
Another form of matching aid which is used quite extensively for 
public school financing is an arrangement whereby the state requires the 
school district to put forth a fixed fiscal effort before the subsidy be-
comes available. The external grant would actually be the difference 
between the minimum level of per pupil expenditure, decreed by statute, 
and the per capita educational revenues furnished by the local govern-
ment. The expenditure effort on the part of the local jurisdiction is 
often circumscribed by state laws. A common practice is to specify that 
a certain millage rate must be applied to the local property tax base and 
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the resulting revenues mandated to public schools, before a local 
community is eligible for foundation aid. Since foundation aid seeks 
to secure a minimum level of education expenditures for all pupils, aid 
formulas containing foundation grants are found in every state of the 
union. 
As indicated in Figure 7, a community with very limited resources 
would most likely consume some quantity of X like ox1 . This would be 
below the minimum fiscal effort, ox2 , required of the community for aid 
eligibility. In order to receive aid, the local government must spend 
Y1Y2 additional on X. Then the state will provide aid necessary to 
bring the education level up to the statutory minimum. This minimum 
30 
is represented by unit level ox3 , with the state providing resources to 
purchase x2x3 • A total budget restraint is traced out by the line AMNB'. 
Note that line segment NB' is parallel to initial budget line AA', 
indicating that no further matching is available beyond ox3 • A variation 
of this approach is sometimes used to make available additional matching 
funds. In this situation, the slope of the NB' line would decline and 
follow a less steep path like NB" (resultant slope of NB" would indicate 
the matching ratio). 
While the above analysis is correct for those local connnunities with 
serious resource deficiencies, most of the recipients would likely have 
adequate resources that permit educational expenditures substantially in 
excess of the statutory minimum. These communities would tend to view 
the grants similar to an external income subsidy, since no additional 
local effort is required to receive the aid. If in Figure 7 it was 
assumed that beginning equilibrium is to the right of the minimum 
specified level of ox3 (for example, at ox4) then the outside grant, 
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which provides MN of X from external sources would release local funds 
current,ly spent on X, and they could be reallqcated as the local connnunity 
chooses. A likely new equilibrium position for this representative 
government could exist at ox5 , given the overall budget constraint of 
AMNB'. The final solution in this case is similar to those predicted for 
general and specific non-matching aid--i.e., an expenditure response of 
b • i 30 su stitut on. 
While the latter analysis indicates that the substitution response 
31 
would occur for the majority of those receiving education aid, a 
stimulation response would be expected in the case of resource-poor 
communities which started at ox1 • Price elasticity of demand would not 
be a factor with this form of matching aid. Actually, the matching 
amounts are determined by the connnunity's resource level and the state 
laws' dictating how much of the resources must be devoted to the public 
good. 
Minimum Support Level Aid 
A type of aid very similar to Foundation Aid is a grant that also 
sets forth a minimum local effort on the part of recipient governments 
before the external government will release matching funds. With Foun-
dation Aid, the outside government supplies a lump sum amount to match 
local government spending and thereby guarantees that all residents 
receive a minimum uniform amount of the public commodity (this quantity 
is ox3 in Figure 7). However, with Minimum Support Level Aid the emphasis 
is on the minimum amount of the service that the local community must 
supply from its own resources in order to be eligible for outside 
assistance. In other words, the overall total level of public service 
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is not specified, as in Foundation Aid, but only the level where the 
external government will begin to offer matching funds. 
Actually, the pre-grant level of expenditure has a strong bearing 
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on the final expenditure response to Minimum Support Level Aid so the 
graphical analysis will outline several possibilities. The first case, 
shown in Figure 8, is where the local government is in initial equilibrium 
at ox1 , and the minimum support level is specified at ox2• Beyond this 
level the outside government is offering matching funds on a 50-50 basis, 
as indicated by the slope of line RA" being one-half the slope of line 
segment RA'. Since the local community is consuming less than the 
minimum service level it will have to expand outlay from its own resources 
to the amount ox2 before it receives any grant funds. It must be noted 
that the community in question is on indifference curve r1 and it would 
be moving to a lower level of community welfare if it increased spending 
on X to the ox2 level. Even if the community accepted some grant funds, 
and, for example, moved to level ox3 , the indifference curve, r3 , tangent 
to the budget restraint at this level is still below curve r1 which 
indicates the recipient would suffer some loss in overall community 
satisfaction by accepting aid. Actually, the local government would be 
better off by refusing the aid and remaining at service level ox1 • It is 
likely that the above description is somewhat representative of those 
communities in our nation that do turn down outside aid. 
In the second case, the local community might be consuming X at 
the minimum support level of ox2 and an improvement in recipient welfare 
would occur by accepting outside funds. If the local government moved 
to ox3 of X (grantee and granter are each providing one-half of the 
funds necessary to purchase x2x3) then this would be a movement up 
from the r2 to the r3 indifference curve and a subsequent increase in 
welfare. 
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In the third and final situation, the local government may be in 
pre-grant equilibrium beyond the minimum support level of aid (OX2), say, 
at ox4 .. Depending on the price elasticity of demand, the grantee com-
munity would move to a position of the RA" line which would provide a 
quantity of the X good equal to or greater than ox4 • Essentially, this 
expenditure response would be identical to the simple "open-end" matching 
case previously described. 
While the final expenditure response to Minimum Support Level Aid 
will be a function of the elasticity of demand providing the recipient 
government is consuming X at a rate equal to or greater than ox2, the 
initial equilibrium level will determine whether the response is only one 
of stimulation or whether it encompasses other response possibilities as 
well. A strong stimulation response is predicted whenever the initial 
equilibrium is exactly at the minimum support level. And, if initial 
equilibrium is in excess of the minimum service level the response could 
range from substitution to stimulation (this range does include the 
neutral response). In the case where initial equilibrium is below the 
minimum support level then it is assumed that no expenditure adjustment 
would take place voluntarily. 
In sunnnary, the actual expenditure response of local governments to 
matching aid is a function of: the demand elasticities for the aided 
commodity, the specific restrictions associated with aid arrangements, 
and, the initial equilibrium position of aided governments prior to aid 
which may result in a response predicated more on the full price (cost) 
effect or may result in a response more related to the income effect only, 
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of the price (cost) change. Depending on the strengths and interactions 
of the above conditions, functional matching aid may elicit an expenditure 
response from local governments that may range from a substitution 
response to a stimulation response. 
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CHAPTER III 
E1:1PIRICAL TESTS OF EXPENDITURE RESPONSE 
ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONAL 
EXPENDITURES 
Introduction 
This chapter will offer an insight into the actual expenditure 
response by local connnunities as they receive subsidies in the form of 
grants-in-aid from external governments. The insight to be gained will 
be a better understanding of the actual amount of per capita local spend~ 
ing forthcoming from local sources on major public functional activities 
as a consequence of receiving outside aid. 
The basic outline of this chapter is as follows. First, the 
empirical framework will be presented, which includes the statistical 
model used to estimate actual expenditure responses and other important 
empirical considerations. Secondly, it will be shown how the theoretical 
grant types in Chapter II are related to the functional expenditures of 
local governments. Thirdly, the empirical analysis will be explained 
and evaluated on a function by function basis. Finally, this chapter 
will set forth the similarities and differences of research results with 
other studies in the same field. 
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Empirical Framework 
Model 
The empirical study will be an aggregated statistical analysis of 
the multivariate linear regression type that will estimate the average 
actual aid response of stimulation or substitution for all local govern-
ments in the nation. To obtain the aggregate response it is necessary to 
combine all county, township, municipality, school and special district 
expenditures in each state so that the state total forms the per capita 
expenditure data for the functional regression equations. The important 
variables which affect local expenditure decisions will also be part of 
the estimating equations, but the target variable will be per capita 
outside federal-state aid. The regression will generate a coefficient 
for this aid variable, and this coefficient will become the estimator 
of the change in per capita local expenditures that is forthcoming in 
conjunction with per capita state-federal aid to a particular local 
function. It is this coefficient that empirically estimates aid response. 
The general form of the multiple regression model will be as 
follows: 
where Et 
~=per capita local expenditure including outside aid. p 
A p = per capita federal-state aid. 
x 
n 
= relevant variables pertinent to the particular 
function. 
Separate regressions will be run on each function: Education, Highways, 
Public Welfare, Wealth, and Public Housing and Urban Renewal. The aid 
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coefficient generated in each estimating equation will be interpreted as 
follows: 
Federal-state aid is stimulating to per capita local 
expenditure, in that spending from local resources is 
increased. 
Local expenditure is not stimulated. This is a 
neutral response, and outside aid is fully exhausted 
on the function. 
Spending from own funds decline, indicating that out-
side aid is used as a substitute for local resources. 
Aid funds are completely substituted for local 
resources. 
This is not an expected outcome. However, this would 
imply that local spending from own funds decrease by 
an amount greater than the aid itself. This service 
would then be analogous to an inferior private good. 
Statistical Considerations 
Step-Down Regression Technique. A very useful device in multivariate 
linear regression is a step-down procedure which eliminates any indepen-
dent variable that is not significant in e}{l)laining the variation in the 
dependent variable. It is possible with this type program to enter all 
the variables into a computer, and then have the computer reject any 
variable which does not have an appreciable effect on the error term 
(this is the residual or unexplained variation). For this research the 
author has used the University of Arkansas Correlation~Regression Program 
(CORREG) which analyzes the variables for significance (5% in this study) 
and rejects those which are insignificant. 1 
Many of the variables have been selected on the basis of "a priori" 
economic reasoning and most of them have appeared in one or more studies 
by others in the field. However, the computer may eliminate some of them 
if they exceed the significance level. The rejections could be caused by 
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intercor~elation with other variables in the equation or by intercorrela-
tion with the error term. The writer will accept these rejections, 
because if the variables are retained it is possible that they may cause 
the coefficient of the target variable, per capita federal-state aid, to 
become distorted. It is important to keep any bias in this key variable 
to an absolute minimum as the aid coefficient is being used to estimate 
changes in per capita local spending. 
It cannot be too greatly emphasized that the primary basis for 
using a step-down multiple regression model is simply to generate a 
stable aid coefficient which can be a dependable estimator of the 
stimulation-substitution expenditure response. In the studies that are 
made to find the determinants of local public expenditure levels or 
changes in local expenditures, the attention of the researcher is 
devoted to minimizing total variation in the specified equations. A 
high R2 is strictly a secondary objective in this study. The prime 
goal is to produce an aid coefficient with minimum bias. 
Use of Cross Sectional Data. The use of cross-section analysis 
rather than time series is somewhat controversial. It is argued that 
time series studies are much better for predictive purposes, because one 
is looking at expenditure changes over time for one particular govern-
mental unit which may have its own unique political and economic 
characteristics. Prediction, then, comes from that unitts own historical 
2 data. With time series studies the variables which are important for 
one local government may be unimportant for others. 
The cross-sectional approach does permit one to look at nationwide 
data and isolate significant variables common to all governmental units, 
Implicit in this approach is the idea that the average local government 
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in Oklahoma is similar to the average local government in New York, Flori-
da, etc. Also, data are more readily available for cross-sectional analy-
sis of local spending than is time-series data. For cross sectional work, 
the data does not have to be corrected for changing conditions over time 
such as cyclical effects, changing attitudes of governments or citizens 
preferences, changing governmental boundaries, and changing governmental 
responsibilities. All the above factors played a part in the writer 
selecting a cross-section approach for this thesis. 
The cross-section expenditure data are taken from 1967 government 
statistics. The U.S. Census Bureau publishes detailed financial informa-
tion on governments at five year intervals. The 1967 data represent the 
latest figures. The 1972 report on governmental finances will not appear 
until late in 1973. 
Use of Unique Independent Variables in the Functional Equation. This 
study departs from most others in the field by the specification of 
special independent variables for certain functional activities that do 
not appear as variables in other functions. For example, when estimating 
the aid response for the Education function a "need" variable will be used 
(percentage of State population between 5 and 18 years of age) which is 
uniquely applicable to education but is not pertinent for highway expen-
ditures or public welfare. The purpose of selecting special variables 
for the various functions is exactly the same as the objective stated for 
the use of step-down multiple regressions--i.e., to secure an aid coef-
ficient which seems stable for predicting a local government expenditure 
response. 
Of course, general variables common to all functions will be used 
as these variables are expected to influence spending for any public 
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activity at the local level. These general variables will be set forth 
when the first functional empirical analysis is explained (see Education 
Variables Selected). The unique variables will be presented as they 
become necessary for each function. 
The set of variables selected for this study are basically a 
representative collection of influences taken from a larger group used 
in prior studies. In addition to being used by others they seem to 
cover an adequate cross-section of demand and supply influences which 
affect local public spending. 
Use of Outside Aid as an Independent Variable. It is the contention 
of some economists that specifying outside aid as an independent variable 
creates some distortion which could result in faulty interpretations. 3 
Thomas Pogue and L. G. Sgontz have condensed the pertinent criticism into 
four statements which indicate potential conditions existing between aid 
and expenditures. These are as follows: 
1. Expenditures are determined, in part, by aid payments with 
expenditures having no effect on aid payments. 
2. Aid payments are determined, in part, by expenditures with 
aid payments having no effect on expenditures. 
3. Aid payments and expenditures are jointly determined. 
4. At least some of the factors determining expenditures also 
influence aid, and the set of variables does not include 
all of these common determinants. Instead, some of the 
factors which influence bgth aid and expenditures are in-
cluded in the error term. 
If any of the final three conditions occur, then the aid coefficient 
may be biased. An unbiased and independent condition exists between aid 
and expenditures if statement one is valid. Statement two implies the 
direct opposite of the position taken in this study--i.e., the local 
expenditures have a causal effect on outside aid. It is felt that 
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inverse causation is rather unlikely, but statement three could be a 
distinct possibility. This is particularly the case when specific 
matching grants are involved. The implication is that grantee and grantor 
response is dependent on the action of the other party. The fourth point 
may have validity if the aid variable is really a proxy for some other 
variables not included, but which are the causal factors in per capita 
expenditure variation. This means that aid is correlated to the unex-
plained variation which exists in the error term of the regression. 
Any existing coefficient bias is assumed to be positive if (in 
statement two) aid is an increasing function of expenditures and if (in 
statement three) expenditures are an increasing function of aid and aid 
is an increasing function of expenditures. Also, positive bias would 
result for statement four if non-included variables which tend to 
increase per capita expenditures tend to increase aid simultaneously. 
One method of showing the possible existence of this bias is 
provided by Pogue and Sgontz. They regress aid on other independent 
variables used in expenditure studies and find that these variables 
explain a significant amount of the variation in aid payments. This, in 
effect, shows a biased condition because of multi-collinearity. While 
it is recognized that multi-collinearity may exist, it is virtually 
impossible to completely eliminate it in any uncontrolled experimental 
analysis. However, every attempt will be made to reduce this inter-
correlation by retaining for the equations those variables which exhibit 
the highest degree of independence. 
It is usually specific matching aid that most critics have in mind 
which questioning the use of aid as an independent variable. They stress 
the fact that recipient governments must put up a portion of the project's 
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funds from their own resources in conjunftion with aid. This seems to 
ind.icate the possibility of joint or reverse determinency between expen-
ditures and aid--i.e., aid is fully or partially determined by 
expenditures. For example, if a 50-50 matching grant is assumed, it is 
expected that aid would always be fifty percent of local expenditure, 
and the correlation coefficient would equal unity between aid and the 
community's matching portion. 5 While it is true that a one-to-one 
correspondence exists statistically in this particular case, yet, if it 
can be shown that the local funds were raised as a result of the outside 
grant, the external aid can still be considered as an independent force. 
In order to justify the inclusion of aid as an independent variable, 
it is important to know the procedure by which matching aid is made 
available to recipient governments. This aid is generally allocated 
either by apportionment programs in a fashion similar to the way federal 
highway aid is extended to states or on a "project" basis. Either way, 
the recipient governments know the conditions under which the aid is 
available. This means that aid is basically a function of the federal or 
state legislative process and that local governments have adequate 
knowledge of the processes and requirements for receiving aid. To illus-
trate, apportionment formulas for the 1960 appropriations were set up in 
the Highway Act of 1958. This gave two years' advanced knowledge before 
6 the funds were actually disbursed. Again, the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare has indicated that aid is a function of the legis-
lative process: " ••• the total amount that the Federal Government can 
distribute under each formula is determined in advance by specific 
Congressional appropriation. 117 If aid is detEirmined autonomously by 
forces beyond the control of receiving governments, then it is these 
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forces which determine aid and not the matching expenditure from local 
sources. It is the belief of this writer that the primary force deter-
mining matching aid is the legislative process of grantor governments. 
If this is correct, then outside aid can be included as an independent 
variable in the functional equations. In other words, statement one of 
the previous four statements concerning aid bias will be accepted as the 
most appropriate for use in this study. The other three statements will 
be assumed to cause only minor bias if they influence the dependent 
variable in any manner. 
The question of outside aid being included as a component of the 
dependent variable needs additional clarification. As stated in the 
introductory chapter, aid is a component of the dependent variable as a 
natural consequence of the use of local direct per capita spending on 
each aided function. For statistical analysis some feel that this is 
somewhat undesirable. In fact, Morss has sought to show by a simple two 
variable regression equation--first, regressing total per capita state-
local expenditures on federal aid; then subtracting the aid from the 
independent variable; and finally, regressing this on per capita aid--
that the results of the second regression are insignificant. The aid 
coefficient declines from 1.25 to .25, and the zero order correlation 
coefficient declines from .30 to .02. 8 While some loss in explanatory 
power is expected if the aid component is dropped from the dependent 
variable by use of multiple regression analysis rather than a two variable 
model, it is possible to maintain significance when aid is either included 
or excluded from the dependent variable. 9 The aid coefficient does 
decline by exactly one, but this is merely a mathematical phenomenon 
which is to be expected.lo The loss of explanatory power which results 
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from specifying the equation in the latter form may not be that serious: 
II 
.. to base one's conclusion on simple regression analysis is not 
adequate. One must use multivariate analysis, otherwise erroneous 
conclusions are reached. 1111 
Classification of Expenditures by 
Theoretical Grant Types 
The theory chapter outlined the abstract expenditure responses 
anticipated from individual local governments which receiving certain 
types of aid--i.e., general non-matching, specific non-matching, and 
specific matching aids. However, the empirical study uses data relating 
to functional grants and functional expenditures on the five major local 
services of Education, Highways, Public Welfare, Health, and Public 
Housing and Urban Renewal. These functional responses, generated statis-
tically, are in reality aggregative responses of all local governments. 
In order to relate the empirical response to the abstract response it is 
necessary to identify the dominant type of aid common to the functional 
activity and then assume that the aggregate response is the sum of all 
individual responses. It is difficult to determine with absolute precise-
ness what the predominant grant type is for each function as the Census 
Bureau data are not prepared to supply this information. Yet, there are 
references throughout the literature whcih gives clues as to the main 
grants associated with the above functional activities, and the writer 
has had to depend on these references to make predictions concerning 
grant dominancy. 
50 
General Non-Matching Grant Type 
None of the functional expenditure categories is dominated by this 
form of subsidy. Therefore, the empirical research will not run tests 
in this area. It should be noted that the theoretical response for 
general non-matching aid is identical to the one anticipated for specific 
non-matching subsidies except for several minor qualifications, and the 
study does contain one function, Highways, which is dominated by specific 
non-matching aids. A statistical regression will be performed on this 
Highway function. 
Specific Non-Matching Grant Type 
Highway Function. All states except Alaska, Hawaii, and West 
Virginia made grant-in-aid payments to the localities almost entirely in 
h f f h d h . h 12 t e orm o s are ig way-user revenue~ Most of the payments are on 
some formula basis that involves a measure of "local needs": such as, 
road mileage, land area, gasoline sales, motor vehicle registrations, 
or resident population. Even with these "need" factors included, the 
state aid is still given on a shared basis; so the aid would be considered 
as specific non-matching for purposes of this research. Direct federal 
aid to local communities for local road construction or maintenance is 
virtually negligible and need not be considered as an influence on 
local spending. The federal aid goes principally to the states who then 
construct extensions to the highway systems within municipal jurisdictions. 
Specific Matching Grant Type 
Education Function. The dominant aid to this function is "foundation" 
type state aid; however," •· the number of variations on the foundation 
program theme defies summary description and an evaluation of their 
impact. 1113 This aid is available to bring educational levels up to a 
minimal standard; therefore, these grants provide a stimulative effect 
to those connnunities which, resource-wise, are extremely poor. Most 
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local jurisdictions spend much more than is called for by minimum founda-
tion programs, and no incentive is provided by foundation aid for 
d . b d h · · 14 expen itures eyon .t e minimum. It should be noted, as outlined in 
the theory chapter, that the aid response associated with the foundation 
aid grant depends to a large extent on the initial equilibrium level of 
spending prior to aid. And this equilibrium will determine whether the 
response is subject to the full price effect or is influenced primarily 
by the addition to local income which the external aid provides. 
Public Welfare, Health, and Public Housing and Urban Renewal 
Functions. All of these activities are funded mainly by the federal 
government, and the aid programs would fall under the specific matching 
15 type grant. In the case of Public Welfare, all federal aid goes 
initially to the states, but in fifteen of the states this outside money 
is channeled through state treasuries to the local governments, and these 
local jurisdictions are then responsible for the matching portion of the 
assistance programs. 16 In the other thirty-five states, the control, 
administration, and most of the expenditures are direct state responsi-
bilities. As for health grants, it is difficult to assess the actual 
proportion of aid that is raised entirely from state sources or entirely 
. 17 
from federal revenues. Yet, the writer has examined the programs 
reported as being included in Census Bureau data on State Intergovern-
mental Transfers, and many of these transfers include the notation: 
18 
"federal funds are distributed in fixed ratio to local expenditure." 
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Since the majority of federal health programs are of the matching type, 
this aid will be included as specific matching. When Public Housing and 
Urban Renewal programs are examined, these programs are found to be 
project grants available on a matching basis. The local governments are 
eligible to receive direct transfers from the federal government for 
these activities at the discretion of federal fund administrators. 19 
In summary, the above functions are dominated by simple matching grants 
with the exception of the Public Housing and Urban Renewal function, 
which receives its outside aid principally on a matching basis of the 
project type. 
Empirical Analysis 
Education Function 
Variables Selected. A total of twelve independent variables were 
used in the regression tests run on this function. (See Appendix for 
tabular summary of all variables and their accompanying symbols.) Nine 
of these were general variables common to all the functions tested and 
the remaining three were unique to education expenditures only. In the 
first regression test run on all the functions, only six general variables 
were used, however, the step-down process eliminated all variables with 
the exception of per capita external aid on three of the five functions 
tested. Before running additional tests the writer carefully selected 
three more general variables and in some cases several additional unique 
variables were inserted in the model. It was felt that several more 
variables should be used in order to secure an aid coefficient that 
could be dependent on to predict aid response. 
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The general variables will be presented in detail for the Education 
Function and will then be referred to in name only or by appropriate 
symbol as the analysis unfolds for the other four functions. Unique 
variables will be justified and explained as they are required in each 
functional regression. 
The independent variables corrnnon to all five aided functions (the 
first six were the original set selected) are considered the general 
variables. (1) Per Capita Income, (2) Population Density, (3) Percentage 
of the State Population living in Urban Centers (cities over 2,500 in 
population), (4) Combined Federal-State Aid Per Capita, (5) Percentage 
of State Employment Engaged in Manufacturing, (6) Median Years of 
Schooling,Completed (used as a proxy for attitude of the citizens toward 
public expenditure), (7) Per Capita Market Value of Real Property, 
(8) Index of Political Party Competitiveness, and (9) Percentage of 
Functional Expenditure Financed by Outside Aid. 
The first three factors form the familiar "Fabricant troika" which 
have consistently explained in excess of 50 percent of the total variation 
in state-local expenditures since being first applied to 1942 expenditure 
20 data. Complementary research has continued to show the importance of 
these three variables as late as 1960. 21 One of the later studies 
has included state and federal aid as additional variables along with the 
"Fabricant" variables, and the explanatory power of those expenditure 
' ' d ' bl 22 equations increase quite measura y. 
1. Per Capita Income. This variable is a strong determinant of 
demand in many macroeconomic and microeconomic models. It has been 
included (or some form of it such as family income) in virtually every 
empirical study of public spending. Income represents an ability to 
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exercise a command over goods, both public and private. The higher the 
income of the citizens, the greater is their ability to pay taxes which 
are required to finance local public goods. With higher incomes, it is 
reasonable to expect people to desire a higher level of public services. 
It is therefore assumed that a strong positive relationship would exist 
between the level of per capita income and the level of per capita local 
public expenditures. 
2. Population Density. This variable, based on the number of 
persons per square mile in each state, was first identified by Fabricant 
as a determinant of per capita state expenditures in 1942. Fisher used 
this same variable in replicating the Fabricant study in 1957. The 
density variable is often associated with slightly lower public expend!-
tures, and as Fabricant has noted" ••• when public facilities can be 
used more intensively the cost of meeting specified levels of public 
23 
service per head is lessened." 
Fabricant did envision this variableJ to serve as a "proxy" for 
scale economies, (declining long-run average cost as output increases) 
and it may be possible that per unit costs may fall as public sector 
output expands. However, to estimate economies of scale correctly, 
the emphasis must be placed on cost analysis which concentrates on pro-
duction functions, differential resource costs, and basic quality 
differences. Determinant studies do not lend themselves well to making 
economies of scale estimates as demand variables are usually included in 
24 
estimating equations. 
For some functions, the Density variable may be negatively related 
to expenditures because of underutilization of capital resources and 
because of lags in capital expansion in relation to increases in output. 
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Examples of this can occur in the Education and Highway functions. When 
school buildings become crowded before new ones are built, capital costs 
per unit of education output could be relatively less. In localities of 
dense population, highway construction costs might not rise as rapidly 
as expected relative to the rate at which an increasing population 
would use the highways for transportation. 
In some functional areas expenditures might increase as populations 
become more dense. This may be the case with regard to Public Welfare, 
Health, and Public Housing and Urban Renewal functions. Brazer in his 
classic study on city expenditures indicated that a rising concentration 
of low income persons in city areas could create a need for a widening 
variety of welfare services and result in an increasing rate of welfare 
spending. 25 In summary, it is possible that some functions will show 
positive associations with density, while other functions will be 
negatively related to population concentration. 
3. Urbanization. This is measured as a percentage of the state 
population living in cities exceeding 2,500 population. Brazer seems to 
believe that as the populations move from a rural to an urban environment 
many services become economically feasible and necessary. Fabricant and 
Fisher in their studies found that a greater proportion of a state popu-
lation living in urban places was closely associated with greater per 
capita public expenditures. 26 
Several examples may serve to illustrate why increasing urbanization 
may cause local community expenditures to increase. As people migrate 
from rural to urban areas, not only are new types of services needed 
such as traffic control and street lighting, but other services previously 
handled on an individual basis must now be provided collectively. Cost 
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increasing forces based on improved service scope and quality can be a 
factor, particularly for Public Welfare, Health, and Education functions. 
Urban highway costs can also rise as right-of-way costs increase. Rising 
prices of limited urban land may push up the cost of urban renewal and 
public housing projects. These are just a few of the many factors which 
account for a possible direct relationship between urbanization and 
local government expenditures. 
4. Per Capita Federal-State Aid. This is the target variable for 
the study and it is a powerful determinant of public spending for the 
same reason as per capita income. Outside aid is the most lucrative 
source of local revenue with the exception of local taxes, and therefore 
the ability of local governments to consume public commodities is greatly 
enhanced. Just as disposable income is the major determinant of personal 
consumer spending it is expected that local governments will spend more 
as their income increases--whether.from internal or external sources. 
This is exactly the implication of Assumption 7 in Chapter II. Therefore, 
a direct and strong positive relationship is assumed to exist between 
per capita federal-state aid and per capita public expenditures on any 
aided commodity. Most stimulation-substitution studies have included 
this variable directly or indirectly into their analysis. 27 
5. Degree of Industrialization. This variable is obtained by 
computing the percentage of the total labor force in the state engaged 
in manufacturing activities. In the Brazer research it is contended that 
high wages in the private sector forces local governments to compete 
for the existing supply of workers, and therefore the communities in the 
high wage states, as a consequence of industrialization, must pay higher 
wages and salaries than do those communities located in states where 
manufacturing is less concentrated. 28 With the wage bill being a major 
portion of local government expenditure it is expected that per capita 
expenditures on most functional services would be higher as the degree 
of industrialization increases. 
6. Median Years of Schooling Completed. Citizen preferences for 
public spending should affect the overall level of local governmental 
expenditure including those functions which receive outside aid. Jerry 
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Miner proposed this variable for his study on Social and Economic Factors 
in Spending for Public Education, 29 and he reasons as follows: As the 
general level of education rises in the community, the citizens are 
capable of assessing and understanding the importance or providing 
public services. While their decisions will still be made on the basis 
of self-interest, persons with more education may appr~ciate the wisdom 
of performing services in a collective manner. Benefits of the public 
expenditure relative to the tax burdens imposed may loom more important 
to those with more schooling. Therefore, Miner expects the relationship 
between this variable and per capita local expenditure to be positive. 
7. Per Capita Market Value of Real Property. This variable and the 
two remaining general variables to follow were added immediately after 
the first regression test was completed. As was previously stated, the 
first regression did not produce an adequate aid coefficient which could 
be used to estimate the expenditure response. The writer was compelled to 
search for other factors which were expected to influence local government 
expenditures. 
A measure of wealth of the citizens is actually a measure of the 
capacity and the ability to finance local public services. It has been 
used in a number of determinant studies notable of which are Miner, 
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30 George Bishop, and Sacks and Helmuth. The basic problem with this 
variable is its high intercorrelation with per capita income. It is 
quite difficult to separate out the effect of wealth on spending from 
the effect of income, on expenditure levels. 
Data used to determine this variable are actually an estimate made 
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of market values rather than assessed valuations of property. It is 
the market values that seem to represent more correctly the ability of 
the citizens to support essential public services. The assumed relation-
ship between property values and functional expenditures is expected to 
be positive. 
8. Index of Potential Political Party Competitiveness. This 
variable was included as it is believed that the state where the 
party in power runs the risk of losing that power may have a tendency 
to support public activities at higher levels than those states where 
there is little inter-party competition. The index used differs from 
some in the sense that other indexes postulate differential expenditure 
patterns in states that are one-party controlled by Democrats, from states 
that are one-party controlled by Republicans. This index does not make 
that distinction. Only in a state with highly competitive parties would 
the expectation be that local expenditures might increase. 
The actual index used is one proposed by Austin Ranney, and it 
covers a time span from 1946 to 1963. This is not too far removed from 
the 1967 period used for this study; so the conditions are assumed to 
be the same. The competitive measures are as follows: (1) the average 
percentage of the state popular vote won by Democratic or Republican 
gubernatorial candidates; (2) the average percentage of the seats in 
the state senate held by Democrats or Republicans; (3) the average 
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percentage of the state house of representatives seats held by Democrats 
and Republicans; and (4) the percentage of all terms for governor, 
senate, and house, in which the Democrats or Republicans had control. 
With all four percentages carrying equal weight, an index was computed 
ranging from 1.000 (total Democratic success) to .000 (total Republican 
success), with an index number of .500 representing perfect two-party 
. . 32 
competition. 
For this dissertation it was assumed that local governmental poli-
tical competition in a state would follow closely state competitiveness 
on the average. It is actually state competition that is being measured 
by the index. The more competitive (the closer the index approached 
.500), the more likely it would be for elected officials to promote 
higher levels of public services including those which received direct 
federal and state aid. 
9. Percentage of Functional Expenditure Financed by Outside Aid. 
The rationale for including this variable comes from the research con-
33 ducted by Sacks and Harris, Ira Sharkansky, and Jack Osman. This 
variable is very similar in nature to per capita federal-state aid 
in that it is a measure of outside resources which support local expen-
diture (intercorrelation problems will exist with this variable and 
per capita outside aid). However an added factor is present here. It 
is expected that the greater the percentage of public spending that is 
financed by external sources, the less incentive there will be for the 
local citizens to hold down expenditure levels. Citizens are assumed 
to offer more resistance to public sector spending when they bear the 
tax burden directly. Therefore, a positive relationship is anticipated 
between this variable and all functional expenditure. 
10. Percentage of Population Between 5 and 18 Years of Age. This 
variable, along with the next two, are the unique variables that were 
selected as being particularly significant for the Education function. 
The percentage of people in the school age category is a prime measure 
of "need" for education as this group makes up the chief educational 
34 input. A positive relationship is expected between this variable and 
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education expenditures. A number of writers who have researched education 
activities have indicated that a "need" variable of this type is influen-
tial in determining educational expenditures. Several of the more 
notable writers are Werner Hirsch, Jerry Miner, George Bishop, and Edward 
35 
Renshaw. 
11. Percentage of State Population Non-White. The hypothesis for 
this variable's influence is aptly expressed by Miner. On the cost side 
the dominant white majority controls school expenditures. This group 
often permits the black schools to deteriorate and will assign to these 
schools less experienced and lower paid teachers. On the supply side, 
then, the black schools will be operated on a lower cost per pupil, so 
for this reason the variable would likely be negatively related to educa-
tion expenditure in states with above average black populations. Also, 
in terms of demand for education, the minority groups being the lower 
income groups often oppose increases in educational spending as they 
associate increased spending with increased tax burdens. This demand 
consideration again implies a negative relationship.• If demand and supply 
effects are combined an overall inverse relationship is expected to occur 
between local per capita expenditures for education and the percentage 
of the state population that is non-white. 36 
61 
12. Percentage of Students Enrolled in Non-Public Schools. There 
are several viewpoints concerning the impact of this variable on educa-
tion expenditures. Jerry Miner took the position that public school 
spending will decline as more children attend parochial schools. He 
bases his belief on the assumption that parents of these children cannot 
be counted on to give support to bond issues which increase property 
37 taxes. Another study conducted by H. Thomas James from Stanford 
University presented an alternative hypothesis. In his analysis he anti-
cipated that with relatively large numbers of children in private schools, 
a very small increase in tax rates would be necessary to expand public 
expenditures per pupil quite significantly. On a per pupil basis, the 
numerator would be increasing while the denominator would be falling. 
The net result would be positive relationship between the% NPS and per 
. d' f d ' 38 capita expen itures ore ucation. Considering the above opposing view, 
the writer cannot make a definite "a priori" statement concerning the 
impact of the% NPS and per capita expenditures for education. 
Empirical Findings For The Education Function. Local government 
observations for every state were included in the analysis with the 
exception of Hawaii. In Hawaii, the state itself provides all public 
education. 
There were three regression tests performed on this function. In 
the first test, nine independent variables were used, with two (S. COMP 
and DENSITY) being eliminated at the 5 percent level of significance. 
This elimination took place in the step-down process. All twelve 
independent variables were :Included in the second test, and all were 
eliminated in the step-down with the exception of% AID and A/P. These 
two variables were excessively intercorrelated. Their simple correlation 
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coefficient was .842. For this reason% AID was discarded before running 
the final regressions (% AID was also eliminated on regressions run on 
other functions for this same intercorrelation reason). In the last 
regression run on the Education function the step-down eliminated S. COMP, 
DENSITY, and MVP. The amount of total variation explained by the 
remaining eight significant variables, above, was 82 percent, the same 
2 R as generated in the first regression. 
TABLE II 
STATISTICS PERTAINING TO PER CAPITA LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURE FOR EDUCATION 
Standardized 
Independent Regression Standard Regression 
Variable* Coefficient Deviation Coefficient 
Y/P .030 .006 .608 
IND -2.110 .528 - .346 
% NW - .866 .295 - .327 
A/P .312 .092 .305 
% S. AGE 4.368 1.384 .283 
% NPS 1.208 1.310 .084 
TP COMPT 
-
.086 .221 - .051 
URB .065 .161 .039 
*See Appendix for meaning of symbols. 
Partial 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.591 
- .460 
- .381 
.376 
.399 
.155 
- .050 
.130 
By ranking the variables in Table II in order of their importance, 
the most important influence on per capita educational expenditures, as 
based on the standardized regression coefficient and the partial correla-
tion coefficient, is per capita personal income of the citizens in the 
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state. Per capita income is specified as a capacity variable representing 
the ability of the people to provide the necessary funds to support 
public schools. An increase of $.03 per capita expenditure on education 
is forthcoming for each $1.00 increase in per capita personal income. 
The percentage of labor engaged in manufacturing is the second most 
important variable. This variable is supposed to influence public sector 
wage rates on the basis that the more industrialized states would also 
have above average wage rates which would encourage service employees 
on public payrolls to demand and receive higher wages. If this carried 
over into the education function where payroll costs are a substantial 
portion of educational expenditures, it would be anticipat,sd that these 
states would have higher education costs. Actually, the relationship 
between this industrialization variable and per capita education expendi-
tures is negative. This implies the opposite conclusion in that an 
increase in industrialization is associated with a decline in per capita 
education spending. To investigate this discrepancy, an inspection of 
the simple correlation coefficients indicated that the percentage of 
labor engaged in manufacturing is highly correlated, in a positive way, 
with the density variable (population per square mile). The density 
variable is negatively associated with education expenditures; and even 
though this density variable was rejected, it is possible that the 
negative sign on the industrialization variable could be due to the 
intercorrelation with density. In this case, the industrialization 
variable is positively related to the error term. Because of the im-
portance of this variable to the regression equation, it is being retained 
in the analysis even with the wrong sign. 
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The third most important variable is% NW, and as anticipated, a 
negative relationship exists between the percentage of non-white residents 
in a state and per capita educational expenditures. A one percent in-
crease in non-whites is associated with a $.87 decline in local education 
spending on a per capita basis. 
The target variable, A/P, has the correct sign and is the fourth 
most important influence in the regression equation. Since the coeffi-
cient indicates that $.31 per capita is spent on education programs 
for each dollar of aid (per capita) received, the expenditure response 
would be considered one of substitution. 
As for the other factors in the model, the percentage of the state 
population of public school age, the percentage of the population in 
non-public schools, the index of two party competitiveness, and the 
percentage of the population in urban areas were all considered signi-
ficant in determining education spending at the local level. The non-
public school variable shows a positive sign, and while this is not 
proof that the hypothesis concerning a positive relationship actually 
does exist (see discussion under variable 12), it does provide evidence 
that a direct relationship between% NPS and per capita public school 
expenditures is a strong possibility. A wrong sign occurs for TP COMPT, 
and this variable has a large standard deviation. The large standard 
deviation could be due to multi-collinearity problems, 39 or, as Pogue 
and Sgontz have suggested, a coefficient might be biased because of 
correlation with the error term. Since TP COMPT is of minimum influence 
to the regression (as noted by the size of the standardized regression 
coefficient), the elimination of the variable would be unlikely to 
affect the aid coefficient to any degree. 
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Empirical Finding Compared To Theoretical Expectation. The 
substitution response generated statistically seems to be quite compat-
ible with the theoretical result. Specific matching aid of the 
foundation type dominates this function. In the theoretical model it 
was shown that a stimulation, neutral, or substitution response could 
occur for any one local school jurisdiction, however, foundation aid 
laws induced stimulation primarily for the few very poor coI!llTlunities. 
In an aggregate framework, the majority of all local school districts 
seemed to be supporting public education well in excess of the basic 
aid program, and this majority would likely consider the education subsidy 
as simply an addition to overall education revenues. New Jersey school 
aid is a typical example of the national pattern for foundation type 
subsidies. In that state, a form of equalization was present (reference 
to the 1964-65 school year) with the poorest districts eligible for per 
pupil aid of $200.00; yet even the richest districts received a minimum 
grant of $50.00 per pupil. The average aid per pupil amounted to $92.24, 
and few conununities qualified for the theoretical maximum. The net 
result was that all districts received at least the $50.00 minimum while 
f . d h . 40 ew receive t e maximum grant. The effect was essentially an income 
subsidy on an aggregate basis to the whole school system. 
The predominate theoretical effect would be the income effect rather 
than the full price effect, and relating the empirical result back to 
Figure 7 in Chapter II, it would seem that the average conununity would 
be represented by an initial equilibrium position, prior to aid, at a 
point shown as x4 . After aid the average conununity would move to a 
point like x5 which implies the substitution response. 
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Provided that the aid coefficient of .312 is an accurate representa-
tion of the aggregate effect of external aid on local government 
expenditure levels, state aid programs would have to be radically changed 
if the grantor agencies expect aid programs to induce recipient govern-
ments to increase their "own" source expenditure. This study indicates 
that local connnunities were simply substituting outside resources for 
local resources in order to pay for public education activities. 
Highway Function 
Variables Selected. There was preliminary testing done on this 
function using several variables that were subsequently discarded. 
These variables were consistently eliminated from the estimating equation 
in the step-down process. The final regression tests used a total of 
eleven independent variables. These included eight general variables, 
referred to in the Education function (percentage of functional expendi-
ture financed by outside aid was not used as it was excessively inter-
correlated with the target variable, outside aid) and the following 
three unique variables: 
1. Ratio of Urban Expressway Mileage to Total State Expressway 
Mileage. While the writer has found no specific study that has used this 
variable in the above expressed form it is apparent that those researchers 
who have done extensive work in the field of local highway spending such 
as Phillip Burch, George Smerk, and L. R. Gabler and Joel Brest see that 
increases in highway expenditures in recent years have occurred more so 
in the cities than in rural connnunities. As the states and federal 
government have collaborated to build cross-town and by-pass expressways, 
the local governments have been compelled to provide for the relocation 
and widening of local street connections. 41 It is expected that this 
variable would be an important demand factor and the hypothesis is that 
a positive relationship would exist between the variable and per capita 
local highway expenditure. 
2. Snowfall. Climate is considered by Burch as a very important 
factor affecting costs on the supply sideof the Highway function. 42 
Snowfall should be an ideal climate proxy in the sense that those areas 
where snowfall is heaviest will also spend more, relatively, on local 
roads and highways. This expenditure should show up in the form of 
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increased maintenance costs along with more expensive construction costs 
to protect road beds against freezing conditions. It is assumed that the 
statistical relationship between snowfall and per capita highway 
expenditures will be positive. 
3. Road Use. This is a statistic, provided by the Bureau of Public 
Roads, which estimates the vehicle-miles of travel on the local rural and 
municipal network of public roads. The variable is introduced into the 
regression as a percentage of the vehicle-miles of travel in each state 
relative to the total U.S. vehicle-miles traveled. Phillip Burch indi-
cates that road usage is a definite factor that can explain some of the 
variation in highway expenditure, and this variable should have a direct 
and positive influence in per capita local highway spending. 43 
Empirical Findings For The Highway Function. The observations 
associated with the state of Alaska, Rhode Island, and Virginia were 
excluded from the highway regressions. These states do not extend 
grants for local highway purposes. 
Several regressions were computed for this function before a 
stability condition was observed on the aid coefficient and the author 
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became satisfied that the model was adequately stated. In the final 
computer run the variables shown in the above table were significant at 
the 5 percent level with the DENSITY, MVP, and FREEWAY variables being 
eliminated in the step-down procedure. The eight significant variables 
accounted for 59 percent of the total variation in per capita highway 
spending. This is somewhat low, however, the A/P coefficient did not 
change during any of the regression tests by more than $.09 from the $.81 
figure which was generated in the final run. It was this basic stability 
that convinced the writer that further testing was not required. 
Independent 
Variable* 
Y/P 
URB 
A/P 
TP COMPT 
s. COMP 
IND 
MILEAGE 
SNOW 
TABLE III 
STATISTICS PERTAINING TO PER CAPITA LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES FOR HIGHWAYS 
Standardized 
Regression Standard Regression 
Coefficient Deviation Coefficient 
.019 .006 .807 
- .446 .162 - .534 
.813 .191 .461 
- .200 .153 - .255 
2.488 1.550 .232 
- .536 .379 - .181 
- .497 .613 - .115 
.051 .071 .097 
*See Appendix for meaning of symbols. 
Partial 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.386 
- .319 
.537 
- .204 
.249 
- .160 
- .123 
.114 
The first three variables shown in the table continued to occupy the. 
same position in terms of their degree of importance (measured by the 
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standardized regression coefficient) throughout all statistical computa-
tions. It can be seen that the target variable, A/Pis the third most 
important influence in the system of rankings. Wrong signs were 
encountered on the URB, TP COMPT, IND, and MILEAGE coefficients when 
compared to their postulated theoretical relationships to the dependent 
variable. Also, the standard deviations on these variables are quite 
high which implies a broad range of coefficient values. The coefficients 
may be somewhat distorted due to correlation with unspecified influences 
in the error term. It is this factor that may be responsible for the 
change in signs. The URB variable should be retained regardless of sign 
as it is the second most important variable in the entire equation. 
However, it is doubtful whether the removal to TP COMPT, IND, and :MILEAGE 
will improve the regression as the standardized regression coefficient 
and partial correlation coefficient shows them to be of marginal impor-
tance. These ranking coefficients are about one-half the absolute size 
of those same statistics associated with the top three regression 
determinants. Further testing would seem to be unnecessary. 
Based on this final regression, the empirical results show that $.81 
in per capita highway spending occurs when $1.00 in aid is received from 
external sources. The implication is that a substitution response exists 
for the Highway function. 
Empirical Finding Compared to Theoretical Expectation. As has been 
pointed out, the majority of state highway aid was extended to local 
governments on a formula basis with various "need" factors specified in 
the formula in determining the actual aid amounts given to each locality. 
Yet, once these "needs" were determined, the grants (actually gasoline 
excise taxes and license taxes collected locally and remitted to the 
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state) were shared by the state with local governments in the form of 
specific non-matching grants to be used for local road programs. 
A theoretical response of substitution was considered to be the most 
likely response when specific non-matching aid is received by local com-
munities (see Figure 2). However, it was shown that a neutral response 
(aid coefficient of one) might occur if two conditions exist. One 
condition is that the grant might be large relative to "own" source 
spending on the commodity, while the second condition takes in the 
possibility that "own" resource spending was initially zero prior to aid. 
The actual coefficient is close enough to unity to indicate that one of 
the above conditions might exist. There is absolutely no indication 
from highway expenditure data that local governments were not spending 
on local roads in the absence of aid and this seems to eliminate one of 
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the above exceptions. On the other hand, Table I (Chapter I) provided 
some evidence that aid subsidies were quite large relative to "own" 
source expenditure. Table I shows that over 40 percent of total local 
highway expenditures was financed by external grants. An aid coefficient 
close to one should be strongly suspected. The .80 coefficient is not 
only compatible with the theoretical response of substitution but is 
also close enough to unity to not conflict with the actual highway 
expenditure data. 
Public Welfare Function 
Variables Selected. The variables proposed for statistical testing 
on this function consist of the eight general variables (% AID discarded) 
and the following two unique variables. 
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1. Percentage of Families with Incomes Under $3,000.00 Annually. 
A "need" variable, such as LIF, can be an important influence on welfare 
spending. Many studies have incorporated this factor in their statisti-
cal analyses. Several of the more notable research efforts using this 
factor are the Glen Fisher study, and the Thomas Pogue and L. G. Sgontz 
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model. Fisher states that this is the primary "need" variable for per 
capita public welfare spending. 46 It is anticipated that as the percent-
age of families with incomes under $3,000.00 increases in local areas the 
local per capita spending on the Public Welfare function will also 
increase. 
2. Percentage of State Population Non-White. This variable was 
proposed as a unique variable for education spending where it was antici-
pated that an inverse relationship existed. It is assumed to take on a 
positive relationship in connection with Public Welfare activities. The 
reason for this is the fact that non-whites do experience higher unem-
ployment rates and lower average incomes than other ethnic groups, and 
therefore, they qualify for a variety of public welfare programs. Some 
intercorrelation is likely to occur between this variable and the low 
income family variable, but the writer believes that both factors should 
be retained for the initial tests. 
Edward Renshaw does use this variable in his education regressions 
but in his case the variable represents negative attitudes for public 
d . 47 spen 1ng. Need is the overriding consideration here rather than 
citizen preferences. 
Empirical Findings For The Public Welfare Function. Only fifteen 
state observations were used in this sample. The states were California, 
Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming. These were the only states where any measurable expenditures 
48 
were reported on categorical welfare grants by local governments. 
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Local programs are primarily supported by federal aid given on a matching 
basis; however, the state governments are essentially responsible for 
public welfare since a state agency must provide the administrative 
machinery and specify recipient eligibility requirements in order to 
qualify for federal funds. 49 The majority of the states handle this 
function directly at the state level, but even these states often delegate 
to local governments the responsibility for administering the programs 
under state supervision. Even though the local government might contri-
bute some influence to state decisions on welfare programs where the state 
controls and finances the activities and localities only administer them, 
it was felt that a local governmental expenditure study should only 
include those local governments that take part in raising the matching 
financial resources. 
TABLE IV 
STATISTICS PERTAINING TO PER CAPITA LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURE FOR PUBLIC WELFARE 
Standardized 
Independent Regression Standard Regression 
Variable* Coefficient Deviation Coefficient 
% NW 
-26.015 13.636 - .439 
A/P .094 .057 .378 
*See Appendix for meaning of symbols. 
Partial 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
- .482 
.429 
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In the first series of regression tests on the Public Welfare 
function various combinations of independent variables were used, but the 
step-down process consistently eliminated all but the aid variable. Per 
capita outside aid accounted for 96 percent of all the variation in per 
capita local public welfare spending, and the computed coefficient of 
1.107 implied that $1.11 in per capita expenditure was forthcoming when 
$1.00 in welfare grants were received. It was decided that the one-to-
one correspondence between the dependent and independent was so strong 
(outside aid is a component of total spending) that this was preventing 
other significant influences from appearing in the statistical model. 
Therefore, the writer subtracted aid from the total expenditures, and the 
dependent variable then became per capita local welfare expenditures from 
"own" sources only. Under this arrangement a simple two variable regres-
sion would result in the aid coefficient declining by exactly one (the aid 
coefficient would be $.11 and retain the same interpretation with respect 
to total public welfare spending). 
Again, a series of regressions were run against the revised dependent 
variable (a total of six different independent variable combinations 
were used). In the final regression (results shown in the table above) 
the% NW and A/P represented the best statistical results that could be 
achieved. The 5 percent level of significance did have to be reduced 
in order for% NW and A/P to be retained in the equation. The T statistic 
for A/P was 1.6427 which gave a probability of a larger absolute T value 
(sign ignored) of .1271, while the% NWT statistic was -1.9078, producing 
the probability of a larger absolute T value of .0817. The overall 
coefficient of determination on this final regression was 37%. 
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The% NW variable had a sign reversed from the one expected prior to 
the tests. This could be due to the fact that it is serving as a proxy 
for some negative influence included in the error term, with this 
negative power far outweighing the influence of the variable as a "need" 
proxy. Due to its significance, the variable must be retained in the 
equation. In the other regression tests no alternative variable had 
near the explanatory power as% NW. 
With the explanatory power of the model reduced along with a reduc-
tion in the significance level of the independent variables, and with the 
fact that the sample is of very small size, the writer was tempted to 
eliminate the function entirely from the research. On the other hand, 
the statistics do offer some interesting implications. Therefore, the 
Public Welfare function is being retained but the empirical interpreta-
tions must be more tentatively regarded. 
The coefficient indicated that local governments are mildly stimulated 
as a result of receiving grants-in-aid. A $1.00 increase in per capita 
aid elicits a $.09 increase in per capita spending from locally raised 
resources. If the interpretation is put in terms of total per capita 
expenditures, a $1.00 increase in per capita aid is associated with $1.09 
increase in per capita public welfare expenditure. This final estimate 
is virtually identical to the first regression where $1.00 in aid brings 
forth $1.11 in total spending. 
Empirical Finding Compared to Theoretical Expectation. It was shown 
that simple matching aid predominated the Welfare function, and as out-
lined in the theory chapter it was anticipated that a stimulation or 
substitution response could occur depending on the elasticity of demand. 
However, the theoretical "a priori" hypothesis postulated that a 
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substitution or a neutral response might be more likely,,given the limited 
tax sources available to local communities along with the fact that a 
seemingly greater resistance to tax increases occurs at the local 
50 level. If the empirical coefficient on welfare aid is taken at its 
face value, and assumed to be absolutely accurate, then the stimulation 
response would be inferred--i..e., $1.09 in public expenditure would be 
forthcoming when $1.00 in outside aid was received. Of course, this re-
sult. could not be directly transformed into a statement concerning price 
elasticities since the data refers to expenditures, and the expenditure 
figures cannot be readily translated into physical quantities and prices. 
In addition, the factors affecting elasticities, as discussed by Haskell 
(see Chapter II) do not seem applicable to the Welfare function. 
Even though the statistical analysis implied that stimulation did 
take place, there are several factors, which if considered, may make a 
stimulation response less than certain. In the first place, the coeffi-
cient is quite close to unity, indicating a potential neutral response. 
Secondly, the aid coefficient might be biased; and if so, it was shown 
that this bias would be in an upward fashion. 51 While the extent of this 
bias cannot be precisely determined, if it does exist, and if the stan-
dard deviation associated with the welfare coefficient is also taken into 
consideration (the standard deviation of the aid coefficient is over one-
half as large as the coefficient, but this may be partly due to 12% 
significance level), the true coefficient easily could be unity or even 
slightly less than unity. In essence, then, the empirical result does 
not deviate too greatly from the "a priori" hypothesis of what might be 
the true and actual expenditure response. 
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Health Function 
Variables Selected. A total of twelve variables were used in the 
final regression tests on this function. The nine general variables 
were used along with the two unique variables selected for the Public 
Welfare function. These unique variables, percentage of families with 
incomes under $3,000.00, and percentage of state population which is 
non-white, were included for the same reasons given for their influence 
on welfare spending. LIF can also be a "need" factor in the demand for 
public health programs as is the variable %NW. One other unique variable 
was considered for use in the health regression. It was: 
1. Percentage of State Population Over 65 Years of Age. Several 
writers have used this variable in their statistical models. David 
Smith, using data from fiscal year 1965, was unable to show that old age 
persons had a significant impact on health spending. 52 However, in the 
Pogue and Sgontz model which pooled expenditure data over the years from 
1958 to 1964, the above variable was found to be significant at the 10% 
levei. 53 It is assumed that as the percentage of old people in a state 
increases an increase should be observed in per capita public health 
spending. This implies a positive relationship between the variable and 
functional expenditures on health programs. 
Empirical Findings For The Health Function. There were forty 
states included in this sample. 54 As with other functions, the states 
where little or no aid was received by the local governments were 
excluded as observations. 
A number of regression tests were made in order to develop an aid 
coefficient that could be statistically acceptable for interpreting aid 
response. In the first test, the step-down eliminated all but A/P. The 
aid coefficient was $1.18 and the R2 was 52%. It required additional 
testing with several combinations of independent variables before a 
group was obtained that were significant (see those in above table), 
and until enough A/P coefficients were generated that began to approach 
a stable value. In the tests run, the A/P coefficient ranged from a 
high of $1.19 to a low of $1.05. It was this limited range of coeffi-
cients, after repeated testing, which convinced the writer that the 
final coefficient of 1.049 was truly representative of the actual 
expenditure response. 
TABLE V 
STATISTICS PERTAINING TO PER CAPITA LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE FOR HEALTH 
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Independent Regression 
Variable* Coefficient 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standardized 
Regression 
Coefficient 
Partial 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
A/P 1.049 .161 
Y/P .001 .0003 
65+ - .135 .071 
*See Appendix for meaning of symbols. 
.653 
.331 
- .188 
.736 
.268 
- .272 
The final R2 for the Health function was 66 percent, leaving an 
error term which amounted to 34 percent unexplained variation in local 
government expenditure. The old age variable has a negative sign which 
is inconsistent with "a priori" expectations. It was assumed that the 
elderly would need a greater amount of public health care, and therefore, 
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those states where the local government jurisdictions had a greater 
percentage of older citizens would also show higher per capita 
expenditures for health. Even with the wrong sign, the 65+ variable is 
much less important than the other two significant variables (as measured 
by the standardized regression coefficient) in explaining expenditure 
variation, and it does not seem to distort, to any degree, the aid 
coefficient. Therefore, it was decided to leave the old age variable in 
the equation and conduct no further tests. 
The final result on this regression, from an empirical standpoint 
would imply that outside subsidies are stimulative to local spending. 
The aid coefficient indicates that $1.05 in per capita expenditures 
occurs on the Health function in conjunction with $1.00 in per capita 
outside aid being received. 
Empirical Finding Compared To Theoretical Expectation. The 
predominant aid to the Health function is considered to be of the simple 
matching variety. Some of this aid comes directly from the federal 
55 government and by-passes the state, while other federal aid is chan-
neled through state agencies and is listed as state aid. The most 
frequently used basis of distributing health subsidies is in fixed pro-
portion to local expenditures, 56 and it is for this reason that the grants 
are considered to be specific matching. As the theoretical discussion 
suggested, the aid might elicit a stimulation or substitution response 
depending on demand elasticities and on actual program requirements. 
However, to the extent public health programs are not financed by outside 
resources, the local communities must provide for this service from 
local resources. These resources are often quite limited relative to 
"local needs." If matching aid does become available, given the scarcity 
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of local resources, the recipient communities might be more inclined to 
substitute outside funds for local funds. Or, the local authorities may 
simply increase the quality or scope of public health programs rather 
than commit large amounts of additional local resources to this activity. 
An empirical coefficient of 1.049, implying stimulation seems to be 
in direct conflict with the hypothesis that local governments prefer to 
substitute outside resources for internal resources. If the same 
scrutiny is applied to the health coefficient as was done in regard to 
the welfare coefficient, then the possibility does exist that the actual 
response might be one of neutrality or substitution. Since the health 
coefficient is within $.05 of unity, and unity implies neutrality, it can 
. be argued that neutrality nearly occurred (note that the standard 
deviation is large enough to permit a coefficient of less than one). 
In addition, any upward bias would tend to put the true parameter within 
the range that makes the "a priori" hypothesis possible. In the absence 
of data that allows for the conversion of expenditure levels into price 
and quantity figures, the writer can only suggest that substitution or 
neutrality remains a strong possibility--i.e., the coefficient generated 
statistically does not completely rule out a substitution or a neutrality 
response. 
Public Housing and Urban Renewal Function 
Variables Selected. Only nine general variables and one unique 
variable are used for this regression model. The special variable 
proposed is: 
1. Dilapidated Housing. This variable is expected to influence 
the demand for public housing and urban renewal programs. Computation 
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will be on the basis of determining the percentage of the stock of sub-
standard housing in a state relative to the total stock of poor housing 
in the nation. While this variable has not been used explicitly in any 
of the determinant studies on local governmental expenditures, it is the 
writer's opinion that the existence of substantial quantities of poor 
housing in the U.S. encourages many groups concerned about this problem 
to insist that governmental authorities at all levels act to alleviate 
the conditions. A recent study, sponsored by General Electric's Center 
for Advanced Studies analyzed a number of problems connected with public 
housing and urban renewal activities. The study noted that 6.7 million 
of the 66 million housing units in the nation are sub-standard dwellings. 
And, among the six million vacant units, only two million were in standard 
condition. These estimates suggest a growing shortage of decent housing 
and this could act as the catalyst to promote activities on the above 
f . 57 unction, Because of this circumstance, it is the expectation that a 
positive association may exist between poor housing and public housing 
and urban renewal expenditures. 
A total of 46 states were included in these regression tests. Four 
states were eliminated from the sample as no federal funds were reported 
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as being disbursed in these states. 
Initially, four regressions were run on this function in an attempt 
to offset the strong explanatory power of the A/P variable and permit 
other influences to become significant in the model. With outside aid 
accounting for 75% of total expenditure variation, the step-down proce-
dure continued to eliminate all other variables. Only A/P was significant, 
and this target variable coefficient was computed as 1.671 which indicated 
a strong stimulation response. After eliminating several variables on 
81 
the basis of excessive correlation with each other the writer respecified 
the model and made the dependent variable per capita expenditures from 
internally raised resources. This effectively removed the one-to-one 
correspondence which existed between A/P and Ph-Ur/P. Then, five 
additional tests were performed on the revised model using various combi-
nations of independent variables. The best combination appears in the 
table below. 
TABLE VI 
STATISTICS PERTAINING TO PER CAPITA LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC HOUSING AND URBAN RENEWAL 
Independent Regression Standard 
Variable* Coefficient Deviation 
A/P .6850 .227 
IND 11.2113 8.076 
DENSITY .0020 .002 
*See Appendix for meaning of symbols. 
Standardized 
Regression 
Coefficient 
.580 
.217 
- .193 
Partial 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.422 
.209 
- .161 
The unique variable which is the percentage of dilapidated housing 
in the state related to the total U.S. stock of dilapidated housing, was 
never a significant influence in any of the regression runs. An inspec-
tion of the zero order correlation coefficient with respect to "own" 
source spending provided the reason for its insignificance. This 
statistic was only .208. 
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The IND and DENSITY variables were marginally significant to the 
equation with the probability of absolute T values of .1725 and .2979 
respectively. However, other variables showed less significance. In 
addition, the DENSITY variable was inversely related to the dependent 
variable. This is in opposition to the hypothesis that public housing 
and urban renewal spending would increase as localities experienced a 
rising concentration of persons residing in the jurisdiction. The wrong 
sign on DENSITY could be due to the variable being negatively correlated 
with some unexplained influence in the error term, and with the insertion 
of DENSITY into the model it is serving as a "proxy" for this unknown 
factor, thereby taking on the sign of this factor. Other regression runs 
without the DENSITY variable included did not result in an appreciable 
change in the A/P coefficient, so the writer decided that the affect of 
DENSITY was very minimal at best. The A/P variable was highly significant 
even with aid removed from the dependent variable. The probability of a 
greater absolute Twas less than one percent. The overall R2 for the 
final regression was low, being 36 percent; but this is to be expected 
after removal of aid from total spending. 
With the aid coefficient computed as .685 this would be interpreted 
as $.69 in spending from "own" sources being associated with each $1.00 in 
external subsidy received. If the interpretation is put in terms of 
total public housing and urban renewal spending, a $1.69 increase in 
total expenditures is forthcoming when $1.00 in outside aid is received 
by local governments. This empirical result shows a very strong 
stimulation response has taken place. 
Empirical Finding Compared To Theoretical Expectation. As previously 
indicated, the aid which predominates this function is matching subsidies 
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of the project type. It was also noted that with this type of aid the 
local communities were generally spending little or nothing on the 
function prior to receiving aid. Expenditure data support this contention 
over the entire period from the time the first major federal public 
housing legislation was enacted during the Depression, and from the time 
that urban renewal aid first became available in 1949. As late as 1967, 
all local governments combined were spending only approximately $700 
million of their own funds in this functional area, while during the same 
year the federal government was subsidizing the function with nearly the 
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same amount of resources. In that same year the states were providing 
virtually no assistance whatsoever. In fact, the Census Bureau listed 
just a handful of state governments that even participated in public 
housing and urban renewal activities. They were Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. 60 In essence, 
it was actually the availability of federal project monies that induced 
the local governments to embark on public housing and urban renewal 
61 programs. 
In the theoretical model, project matching aid given principally by 
the federal agencies directly to local governments would result in a 
strong stimulation response. As shown in Figure 6 in Chapter II, the 
recipient governments would move from a point of zero (or nearly zero) 
consumption as depicted by point A in the graph to some output level as 
determined by the actual specific subsidy amount. The aid coefficient 
generated statistically definitely corroborated the theoretical conclu-
sion. This aid parameter showed a stimulation response so strong that 
the accuracy of the empirical result could hardly be questioned. A one 
dollar per capita receipt of public housing and urban renewal aid is 
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associated with $.79 per capita increase in 11own" source spending on this 
function. 
Comparisons with Other Expenditure 
Response Studies 
The regression results of this study are generally not directly 
comparable with the findings of others who have investigated the 
stimulation-substitution response. The reasons for this are: most other 
studies combine state and local government expenditures together and then 
attempt to estimate the expenditure response on this total amount; most 
other studies concentrate on the expenditure response to federal aid and 
ignore state aid; other studies use different time periods and different 
combinations of independent variables. However, even with these basic 
problems, there are some similarities and differences that are worthy 
of discussion. 
In regard to studies concentrating on combined state-local expendi-
tures, where federal aid is the external source of funds, the following 
results were obtained: 
Smith 62 Osman 63 Sacks and Harris St d· 64 Function Study Study u y 
Education 1.0642* 2. 71 
Highways 1.1723* 1. 37 1.259 
Public Welfare 1. 5238* 1.37 1.683 
Health and 
Hospitals 1.0086* 2.09 2.355 
*All coefficients were increased by one in order to make all the above 
coefficients comparable. Smith regressed expenditures from "own" 
sources on outside aid, and this necessitated the correction. 
These coefficients indicate that stimulation is taking place in all 
functions, whereas the writer's study found unquestioned stimulation 
only with regard to the Public Housing and Urban Renewal function (not 
examined above). On comparable functtons, the above studies showed 
coefficients higher than those found by this writer. 65 It is possible 
that more upward bias may occur when combined state-local spending is 
regressed on federal aid. This could be the case if the federal aid is 
directed primarily to state activities (which is usually true) while 
the dependent variable has included a large component of local expendi-
tures. The resulting regression coefficient may tend to be overstated 
in this situation. 
There are two noteworthy studies on education which do concentrate 
on the state aid aspect of grants, as does this paper. 
Function 
Education 
66 Bishop Study 
,06 to .80 
Renshaw Study67 
.163 
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These statistics indicate substitution is the response. Results here are 
similar to the regression solutions generated in this research, but 
again, it is difficult to make direct comparisons because of dissimilari-
ties in the equation specifications. Both of the above studies used per 
pupil expenditures as the dependent variable and per pupil state aid as 
the independent variable, whereas the writer's analysis used per capita 
figures for the entire population. Also, the size of estimating equations 
are different, and this might affect the results. Eight significant 
variables appeared in the final regression in this research while the 
Bishop and Renshaw studies used only three independent variables. In 
addition, different time periods were used, and this could create 
difficulty in comparing coefficients. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1Another method is outlined in Elliott R. Morss, and J. Eric 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
The question whether external aid from state and federal sources to 
local governments results in a stimulation or substitution expenditure 
response was approached from an abstract theroetical standpoint which 
was then subjected to empirical testing. In the examination of this ques-
tion it was assumed that local governments would be influenced by outside 
aid, and the statistical regressions on the five major local government 
functional spending activities did confirm that this was the case. The 
partial correlation coefficient furnished a guide to which factors were 
most prominent in determining local expenditure levels. By the use of 
this statistic it was found that per capita state-federal aid actually 
ranked first in importance with three of the five functions: Highways, 
Health, and Public Housing and Urban Renewal. Per Capita state-federal 
aid occupied a second place ranking with Public Welfare and a fourth 
place ranking with the Education function. 
While this research had no control group or prior standard with 
which to compare the empirical results, the primary basis for comparison 
was the extent to which the statistical inferences as to expenditure 
response were compatable with. the response inferences developed in ab-
stract theory. The following were the response possibilities which were 
developed by the theoretical and empirical models: 
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Function Dominant Aid Type Theory Response* Empirical Response 
Education Foundation Aid Substitution to Substitution 
(Matching) Stimulation 
Highways Specific Non- Substitution Substitution 
Matching 
Public Welfare Simple Matching Substitution to Slight Stimulation 
Stimulation 
Health Simple Matching Substitution to Slight Stimulation 
Stimulation 
Public Housing Project Aid Stimulation Strong Stimulation 
and Urban (Matching) 
Renewal 
*The theoretical response shows the range of responses; so a neutral 
response may be possible with some functions. 
As can be seen from the foregoing tabular summary, three functions--
Education, Public Welfare, and Health--permit a broad range of potential 
theoretical expenditure responses. Yet, the statistical coefficients 
indicated that local governments were substituting outside funds for 
local resources, or were simply adding the external funds as a supplement 
to existing expenditure levels (see Chapter III under Public Welfare and 
Health for a full discussion of potential substitution or neutral impact 
of grants). 
It is usually assumed that the primary objective of state and federal 
aid is to act as an incentive for local governments to expand the service 
1 levels from locally raised revenues. This understanding is based on 
viewing aid from the grantor standpoint. However, consideration must be 
given to the fact that recipient governments face severe financial 
limitations brought on by the following conditions: extensive tax 
competition is carried on by local jurisdictions in an effort to attract 
new industries and wealthy residents; there is an excessive fragmentation 
of local areas into separate governmental entities which often reduces 
overall fiscal capacity; localities rely more heavily on tax sources that 
are relatively less income elastic for financing public services, and this 
necessitates continuing tax rate increases to meet expanding needs; 
there is generally greater resistance by citizen-voters at the local 
2 level to tax rate hikes. The above conditions could easily create a 
preference on the part of local decision making authorities to substi-
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tute external funds for local funds or a preference to expand the quality 
and scope of existing local services by only raising expenditures by the 
amount equal to available outside grants. If, as the writer had assumed 
earlier in this study, that a substitutive (or neutral) preference 
pattern actually exists, then the substitution response (or neutral 
response) could be a more likely possibility. 
This study was not definitive in the sense that it fully and 
unambiguously answered the question of which expenditure response 
would actually occur in all the functional activities examined. In two 
functions, Highways (the only function where non-matching funds are 
available) and in Public Housing and Urban Renewal, the theoretical and 
empirical response was identical. In the remaining three functions--
Education, Public Welfare, and Health--the fiscal realities could force 
local governments to ignore the stimulating objectives of grantor agen-
cies and shape the demand curve for aided goods in a more inelastic 
fashion. This conclusi?n was further reinforced by the fact that this 
research did generate aid coefficients substantially less stimulative or 
more substitutive than those associated with other studies. 3 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 See Morris Beck, "The Role of State Aid in Local Government 
Finance," in Tax Institute of American, Federal, State-Local Fiscal 
Relationships, Princeton (1968), p. 382, and Mark A. Haskell, "Federal 
Grants and Budgetary Distortion," The Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Business, II (May, 1962), p. 87. 
2 See L. L. Ecker-Racz, The Politics and Economics of State-Local 
Finance, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. (1970), 
pp. 7, 13, 19, and James A. Wilde, "Expenditure Effects of Grants-In-Aid 
Programs," National Tax Journal, XXI (September, 1968), p. 346. 
3 See the Chapter III section of Comparisons with Other Stimulation-
Substitution Studies. 
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APPENDIX 
DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES WITH 
ACCOMPANYING SYMBOLS 
Variable 
Dependent Variable 
Local Per Capita Expenditure for Education 
Local Per Capita Edpenditure for Highways 
Local Per Capita Expenditure for Public 
Welfare 
Local Per Capita Expenditure for Health 
Local Per Capita Expenditure for Public 
Housing and Urban Renewal 
Independent Variable (general) 
Per Capita Personal Income 
Median Years of Schooling Completed 
Population Per Square Mile 
Percentage of Labor Force in Manufacturing 
Empl. 
Percentage of Population in Cities Over 
2,500 Pop. 
Per Capita Federal-State Aid 
Per Capita Market Value of Real Property 
Index of Political Party Competition 
Percentage of Fune. Expenditure Financed 
by Outside Aid (with functional subscript) 
Independent Variable (unique) 
Percentage of Population of School Age, 
5-18 years (Education function) 
Percentage of Population in Non-Public 
Schools (Education function) 
Population of State Non-White (Education, 
Public Welfare, and Health functions) 
Urban Freeway Mileage in State (Highway 
function) 
Average Snowfall in State (Highway function) 
Road Usage by Motor Vehicles (Highway 
function) 
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Unit of Measure 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
years 
sq. mile 
% 
% 
$ 
$ 
decmil 
% 
% 
% 
% 
miles 
inches 
miles 
Symbol 
Ed/P 
Hi/P 
PW/P 
He/P 
Ph-Ur/P 
Y/P 
S. COMP 
DENSITY 
IND 
URB 
A/P 
MVP 
TP COMPT 
% AID 
S. AGE 
% NPS 
% NW 
FREEWAY 
SNOW 
MILEAGE 
Variable 
Independent Variable (unique) (Continued) 
Percentage of Families with Incomes Less 
than $3,000 (Public Welfare and Health 
functions) 
Percentage of Population Over Age 65 
(Health function) 
Dilapidated Housing (Public Housing and 
Urban Renewal function) 
Unit of Measure 
% 
% 
$ 
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Symbol 
LIF 
65+ 
% DIL 
VITA ;Y 
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